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INTRODUCTION 
The S even Day ' s  Bat tl e s , J·une 26 thro ugh July 2 ,  186 2 ,  
i n  the Peni ns ular Camp aign of June , 1862 , were among t he 
bloo di e st fo ught i n  the Civil War . Thi s week of hard fight­
ing betwee n the Arm.y of t he Pot omac an d t he Arrny of North e rn 
Vir gini a marked a turning point in t he war .  The r es ult s of 
t hi s  wee k  br ought about the  end of t he mi litar y  career of 
, 
Gen eral Ge orge Brit t on McClellan ,  U . S . A. , and the ri se of 
the mi litary career of General Rob ert E. Le e .  The su bject 
of the Seven Day ' s Batt l e s  i s  one of speculation and arglliuen� 
to thi s day . 
The purpo se  of this paper i s  to give an acco unt of the 
Seven Day ' s  Batt l e s , and t o  point out t he cause s and res ult s 
of this wee k  of f ighting in the Vi rginia Penins ul a. 
In orde r t o  unde rstand the s i t uati on leading i nt o  the 
Seven Day ' s  Batt le s ,  t he author devotes t he fir st chapter 
of this pap er t o  the early par t  of t he Peninsula Caiupaign , 
and t he event s t hat playe d a dir ect part in bringing t he 
S eve n Day ' s Batt l e s  about . 
1 .  
REGION OF THE SEVEN DA YB' FIGHTING. 
Johns on,  Robert u. and Bue l ,  Clarence C . :  
Leaders of the C ival war , Vol .  I I ,  Thomas 
19'6,P. 384 york , 
Edi tors 
yos e l off , 
Battl e s  and 
Inc . , NeW-
CHAPTER I 
McCLELLAN ADVANCES TOW.ARDS RICFIMOl'ID 
When General George B. McClellan began his spring offensive 
agains"G the Confedert1.te Armies, by crossing the Poto.mac River 
to attack the forces of Joseph E. Johnston C.S.A., at Bull Run, 
he discovered that Johnston had abandoned his positions and · 
2. 
moved to the Rappahanock River. 
McClellan felt that a march, overland, to Rich .. u.ond frOl!l 
Washington would be ·c;oo dangerous, so he devised "" plan to trans-
port his troops by water to Fort Monroe, which is situated on 
the Virginia Peninsula at a point close to where the James River 
enters .into lower Chesapeake Bay. From that point, he planned 
to march between the York and Jrunes Rivers, using them to protect 
his flanks and as supply routes, and attack Richmond from the 
east. 
.... 
;; . 
In early April, lti62, the Arm.y of the Poto.mac was before 
Yorktown, the first major objective in it's march to Richmond. 
The Confederate forces in Yorktown under General John Bankhead 
4. 
Magruder numbered approxinmtely 15,000. Johnston had not arrived 
from. the Rappo.hanock River, and the Union forces were conf1dent 
of a rapid victory. Iv1cClellan had approximately 5.3,000 men, with 
2. Catton, Bruce: Th:l_s Hallowed Ground, Doubleday & co., Inc., 
Garden City, New York, 1956,._p. 129. Hereafter cited as Catton, 
This Hallowed Ground. 
J. � . •  p. 129. 
4. Ibid., p. 129. 
-
2 .  
5. 
more arriving on t he peninsula daily . Whi le the Union forces  
were prepari ng for thei r attack on Yorktown, General Magruder 
succe s sfully employed a t heatrical tri ck that  was to chan ge t he 
entir e pi ct ure of the Peninsula Campaign. At a poi nt just to t he 
front of the mo st advanced Uni on positi ons , there was a clearing 
in a clump of woods. Magruder selected a. couple of regiment s 
from hi s garri son t o  march, i n  view of t he Union troops, t hrough 
the cle aring; t hen do uble time around the woods, and march acros s 
the cle aring aga i n .  This gave the Union off icers the impression 
that it was a continuous line of troops cros sing t heir front . ·  They  
reported the i ncident as such, and decided t hat t he .confederates 
were in gre at strength in Yor ktown. Plans for an i .mm.ediate att::.c.k 
were di sp ensed wit h, and McClellan deci ded  to  take Yorkt own by 
6 .  
siege . Magruder had gambled fo r t ime and had won . It t ook the 
remainder of the month of  April for the Army of the Pot omac to 
bring up its s iege guns , and to prepare positi on s  for t hose _gu ns . 
In that time,  t he defense s of Yor kt own were bui lt up, and Johnston 
7. 
had arrived with hi s army . 
Among the weapons bei ng gathe red by the Army of t he Potoll18.c, 
there were thirty-t hree 100-pound fi re shell s,  that had been 
devi sed by the Uni on Ordinance Department;  the s e  were never put 
B. 
to us e by McC le llan .  
,,/"" 
The final blow to Yorktown was to  begin  o n  May 4, 1862 , but 
5. Catton, �Hall owed Ground, p .  129. 
6 .  Ibid . ,  p .  130 .  --· 
7. Ibid . ,  p .  1 30 
8. Bruce ,  Robert V . :  Lincoln and t he Tools o f  War, Bobbs-Merrill Co . ,  
New York & �Indianapolis, !956-.-Hereafter C"Ited as  Bruce . 
) . 
when the Uni on troops manne d their positi ons on that morni ng, the y 
di scovered that J o s e ph E. Johnston had withdrawn fro m Yorkt o trm, 
9.  
rather than �uff e r  the si ege . After so me delay, McClellan was 
abl e t o  follow Johnst on ' s  retreat , and on the 5th of May , the 
advancing Uni on forces c a me upon t he prepared Confe derat e  posi t i ons 
at Wi lliamsburg . In the batt le that fo llowe d ,  the Uni on army was 
able t o  force Johnst on t o  retreat , but lost 2 ,2 .3 9  me n, including 
those ki lled , wo unded, and mi ssing . Johnst on had lost 1 , 70.3 men, 
inc luding tho s e  ki lled, wounded ,  and mi ssing , but had further 
1 0 .  
de layed McCl ellan ' s  march t o  Ri c hmond . 
Word of Johnst on ' s withdrawal fro m Yorkt own and the batt le 
of Willi a msburg had reache d Ric hmond . Along wit h  t hi s  inf ormat ion 
was the report that Uni on gunboat s had t rave led up the York 
11.  
Riv e r  to We s t  Point , thirty-seve n  mi le s from Ri chmond . The 
Confederate defe nsive pr eparati ons we re und e r  the leadership of 
i 
Gene ral Wi lli am Mahone • Guns fro.m the Confe de rat e ironclad , 
Vi rgi ni �, had been plac e d  o n  Drewryis Bl uff , pi l e s  had been drive n 
a c ro s s  the James River; ship s  had been. s unk below the bluff, and 
a brigade from Benjamin Huge r•s divisi on was pla c e d  on either s i de 
1 2 .  
of the ri ver t o  keep-Uni on ships from reaching Ri chmond . The 
·ironclad, Vi rgi ni a ,  had been abandone d  whe n Norfolk f e ll to the 
Uni on troops und e r  General Woo l, opening the ri ver for the passage 
9. Catt on : This Hall.o wed .  Gro und;. p .  1 ,32 .  
\ 
10 . Has s l e r , Warre n Vl. 'Jr . : General George B .  McClellan , 
Loui s iana Stat e Uni versity Pre ss , Baton Rouge , La . ,  195 7 ,  
p,102. Hereafter c it e d  as Hassler . 
11 . Fre ema n ,  Dougla s Southall : R .  E. Lee , Vol . II , Charle s Scrib­
ner ' s  Sons; New York , 19.34, P• 43. "-Hereafte r  c i te d  a s  Fre e man. 
12 . Ibi d . , p .  47 . 
4. 
13. 
of Union ships. 
To provide better opening for his naval support, McClellan 
dispatched Gen eral Franklin to drive the Rebels frofil west Point, 
1 4. 
which Franklin did on May 7th, with the aid of Federal gunboats. 
Norfolk had fallen on the 1 0th, and on the 15 th ,  the Union gunboats 
1 5 .  
were driven back from Drewry's Bluff. Johnston was pulling 
back toward Richfilond, and McClellan was .moving down the peninsula. 
This .move was very slow due to the unusually heavy rains in the 
area , which had flooded the stream.s and .made the roads hard to 
1 6 .  
travel. 
Throughout his advance from Yorktown, McClellan was trying to 
convince Lincoln and Stanton of the need for reinforcements-. He 
had been f.orced to leave garrisons behind on his line of march, 
thus depleting his forces; while Johnston had been adding garrisons 
1 7. 
to his numbers as he pulled bacK toward Richmond. The constant 
request for additional troops caused McClellan to lose popularity 
in Washington, and the argum.ents about reinforcements continued . 
18. 
throughout the campaign. 
On May 21 , the A:rmy of the Potomac reached the Chickahofiliny 
19. 
River, after its slow advance through the peninsula. The 
Confederates had destroyed the bridges to Richfilond at New Bridge, 
Mechanicsville Bridge, and the Meadow Bridges. These could be 
1). 
14. 
15. 
16. 
1 7. 
18. 
1 9. 
Donald·, David, Editor and author of text;· Divided We Foug!lt, 
MacMillan Co. , New York, 1956, p. 48. Hereafter cited as 
Divided � Fought. 
Hassler; p. 1 04. 
Freeman, Vol. II , pp, 48 , 49, 
McClellan , George B. ; McClellan's Own Stor¥-, Charles L. Webster 
& qo. , New York, 1887, p. 365. Hereafter Cited as McClellan. 
Hassler, pp. 1 04, 1 05. 
Myers; William S,: General George Britton McClellan, D. Appleton 
&,C:o:, New York, 19 3 4, P• 272. Hereafter cited as Myers. 
Michie, Peter s.: Ge�e�al McClellan, D. Appleton & Co. ,  1901 , 
bro ught unde r  fire by t he defending Confederat es , so McCle llan 
had to bui ld new bridges to gain a crossing to Richmond . This was 
to be no easy task , for the rains sti ll fell , and t he river was 
2 0 .  
flooded and .muddy . 
News reached McCle llan that a concentration of Confe derat e 
troops were holding a position near Hanove r  Co urt House , and he 
sent General Fit z -John Porter to disperse them.  This was done on  
21 . 
May 27 , thus cle aring the Union front of Confe derate s .  
In th e last week of May , McClellan was beginning the construe-
ti on of his bridges ,  sen ding requ ests for reinforcements t o  washing�on, 
and the Confederates were gatheri ng all their available forces for 
the defense of Richmond .  
In order t o  understand the sit uation , i t  i s  necessary to go 
int o the activit ie s of General "St onewall" Jackson in the Shenandoah 
Vall e y .  Jackson was i n  a position to attack through the valley and 
strike at Washingto n .  The Union had the divisions of Banks , Shields , 
and Fremont t o  oppose him; but fear for the saf'ety of' the Capit o l  
was keeping Lincoln and Stanton from sending reinforcements to 
22 . 
McCle llan . Jackson had put fear in the heart s  of the people ot· 
Washington by his activities in the .month of May .  On May 8 , he hit 
the Union forces under Generals ' Schenk and Milroy at McDowel l .  
20 . McClellan , p .  36 2 .  
21 . Johnson; Robert U .  and Bue l ,  Clarence c.: Edit ors : Battl es and 
Leaders of' the Civil YE:,£ ,  Vol. II , Tho.mas Yoselof'f' , Inc . , NeW­
York , l95ti; pp . 324 , 325 . ( F .  J .  Port er}. Hereaf'ter.cit e d  as 
Battles and. Leaders . 
22 . Divi ded  We Fought , p .  5 4, 
6 . 
On the 23rd , he att acke d part of Bank s ' forc e s  at Front Roya l ,  and 
on the 25th , he drove Banks from Winche ste r ,  and by the 29t h , he 
23 . 
was thr e atening Harper ' s  Ferr y .  In an att empt to defeat Jackson , 
Fremont was ordered t o  cut him off at Stra sburg , McDowell ' s  divi sion , 
whi ch McClellan had been promi s ed  as reinforcement s moved to Front 
Royal , and Bank s was moving on to Harpe r ' s  Ferry . The s e  troops 
numbered 45 , 000 men ,  but the move was not well coordinat e d ;  thus 
Jacks on was able to ca use the Union the embarrassment of his succe s s  
from May 8 t o  May 29 , before falling back t o  a pos iti on i n  the Blue 
24. 
Ridge Mountains t o  awai t o rders . 
On May 14 , McClellan wrote  t o  St anto n ,  reit erat ing the beli e f  
that the Rebel s were gather ing i n  for ce a t  Richmond . Again he aske d  
for re i nforcement s ,  pointing that h e  earlier d i s patche s had been 
25 . 
ignore d .  McDowell wa s ordere d t o  j oin McClellan , but hi s orde rs 
were such that any move by Jackson wo uld cancel them. The se  were 
iss ued on May 17 , and r eadi 11While s eeking to e s tablish as soon a s  
poss ible a com.:nunicat ion betwee n your left wing and the right wing 
of General McClellan , you will hold yourself always i n  s uch a po s iti on 
as t o  cover the capitol of the nat ion agai nst a s udden dash of any . 26 . 
large b ody of Rebel force s .  11 Thi s , of cour se;  made �ficDowell ' s 
move do ubly slow .  The t errain and the bad weather were slovdng hi s 
23 . Divided We Fougb.t , p. 65. 
24 . Catt on: Thi s Hallowed Ground , p .  1 34 . 
25 . McClellan; p p .  343-345 . 
26 . J..£!..£., p .  348 .  
7 .  
overland march , and he had to be re ady to turn bac k for t he defense 
of Washington at a .mo.m.ent ' s no tic e .  How c ould he .make contact with 
McCle llan with any spee d under these c ondit i ons? It i s  obvious t hat 
he co uld not , the re sult be ing that McCl e llan had hi s army astride 
the Chi ckaho.m.iny to .make c ont act with McDowell , and McDowell was not 
27 .  
going t o  arrive . On May 16 , McDowell had report e d  that he had 
start e d  hi s move and wo uld be in pos i t i on t o  hit t he Rebe l  left 
flank on May 24 . 
Thi s move was soon stopped by the ac tions of Jackson ' s  for c e s  
in t h e  la st part o f  May . On May 24 , Lincoln wrot e McClellan , sayi ng 
29 . 
that McDowell ' s  order s had been chang e d  t o  att ack Jackso n ' s rear . 
Lincoln ·wro t e  again on the 26th , ·saying that Banks had pul led  back 
to Wi lliamsport aft er fight ing a Confederat e force of abo ut 15 , 000 
JO, 
oen . On the s am e  day Mc Cle llan got word from Stanton that i ndica -
Jl . 
ti ons were t hat Jackson was pulling back toward Richmond . 
McCle ll an ha s bee n  cri t ic iz e d  f or over- e s t iJ!lat ing the s i ze of' 
the confederat e forc e i n  Ri chmond . It i s  only fai r  t o  point out 
that all avai lable intelligence i ndicat e d  the Rebe l for c e  to be 
27 .  Catton: This Hallowe d  Ground , p .  1J6 . 
28 . M i chi e , p. 288.  
29 . � ,.of the Re belli on , Seri es  I,  Vol . XI, Part 2 ,  Offi c i al Re c or d s  
of t h e  Union and Confederate Armi e s , pre pare d by Brevet Lt . Col . 
Robert N.  Scott , under the d i r e c t i o n  of the  Secretar y of war , 
Governme nt Printing Offi ce , Was hingto n ,  1884 , p .  JO . Hereaft e r  
c i t e d  a s  Offici al Re c ords . 
JO . Ibid . , p .  J2 . 
Jl . McClellan , p. J69 .  
8. 
32. 
almost 200, 000. In further defense, were not the people in 
1Nashington being overly cautious as well? Jackson had .about 16, 000 
33. 
to 17,000 troops in the valley. Shields had 10, 900; Banks had 
9,17t>; Fremont about 10, 500; and Schenk had 2,268--all of which were 
3 4, 
in position to defend Washington. If these were united in effori;, 
they could have stopped the threat of' Jaclcson, McDowell could have 
been sent. to McClellan, and the picture may have been different. Le� 
us not forget that Stanton had indicated that Jackson may have been 
moving toward Richmond. The arguu1ent for and against the sending of 
more men to McClellan continued through the months of May and June, 
and as late as June 26, McClellan received assurance that McDowell 
35, 
would arrive to aid him in the capture of Richli1ond. 
So it was, at the end of :May, that McClellan's army was still 
split by the flooded Chiclcahominy River, awaiting the arrival of 
McDowell's corps. In the elapsing time Johnston was building the 
defenses of Riehm.and, and McClellan was attempting to build his 
bridges across the river. This was a task that was to keep .McClellan 
busy and to hold him within six miles of Richm.ond while awaiting the 
reinforcements he deemed necessary for the capture of the Confederate 
Capitol, until the onset of the Seven Day's Battles. 
32. Eckenrode, H. J. Conrad, Bry·an: 
of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
cited as Eckenrode & Conrad. 
George B. McClellan, University 
Hill, 1941, p. 75, Hereafter 
33. Battles and Leaders, Vol. II, p. 301, cited as Will .. Allen 11Jacksons1 
Valley Campaign:' p. 146. . ,. 
34. Official Records, Vol. XTI,Fart l, pp. 462,463, 19, 708, & 290. 
35, Battles and Leaders, Vol. II, Fitz-John Porter, p. 325. 
9. 
Johnston detected the flaw in McClellan's position and attacked 
the Union forces at Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1 .  In the two 
day battle both sides lost heavily. The Rebels were forced to pull 
back into Richmond, and their commander, Joseph E.  Johnston, was 
36 . 
seriously wounded, During the two day battle, the Union forces 
employed the balloon of Prof. T. S. C. Lowe to great advantage in 
37 . 
spotting Rebel Hrtillery positions. Following this battle, the 
rains continued, the work on the Union bridges was renewed, McClellan 
still held the sa.ne faulty position, and Johnston was replaced by 
38. 
General Robert E. Lee. 
McClellan reported his losses at 7 , 000 men in the Battle of 
Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks), indicating that he needed reinforcements 
39 . 
now more than ever. On June 1 ,  McClellan reported that he had 
won a victol'J- at Seven Pines, that the .morale of his troops was high, 
that he would attack when the river fell, and hinted that he could 
40.  
use additional troops as the Confederates outnumbered him, Lincoln 
replied, "Thanks for what you could and did say in your dispatch 01· 
noon today, . •  If the enemy shall not have renewed the attack this 
4 1. 
afternoon, I think the hardest of your work is done.11 
36. Catton: This Hallowed Grounu, p. 139 .  
37, Divided We Fought, p , 5 8 .  
38 . Hassler, p .  129 . 
39, Eckenrode & Conrad, p. 74, 
40 . � • •  p. 72 . 
41 . Ibid., p. 72 . 
10. 
On June 2 ,  McCle llan reported that new rains had wash ed out hi s 
bridge s ,  and on June 4 , he report ed , "Te rrible rain storm during the 
night and .morning. Chi cl(aho.m.iny flooded ,  bridg e s  in bad conditi on. 
I have t aken every poss ible st ep  to i ns ure t he s e c urit y of the c o rps 
on the ri ght bank , but I cannot re inforce t hem here unti l my bri dge s  
42 .  
are safe • • •  I have to be very cautious now. 11 On June 2 ,  Stanton 
had wi re d ,  "All int ere st now centers in your operations and full c o n-
43, 
fidenc e is e nte rtained of your br illiant and glorious suc c e ss . "  
The rains cont inued every day until June 20 , and McClellan kept wash-
44, 
ingt on i nformed of his progress. On June 7 ,  he report e d  that the 
men were working in wais t -deep wat e r ,  and that the rai n was still 
falling. On J une 10 , he said he would attack whe n  t he weather per-
mitt e d ,  and that he would like to have some troops from Halleck ' s 
45, 
army in Mi s s i s sippi. Stanton answered t hat he wo uld refer the 
matt e r  t o  Hall e ck , and conclude d  with a s s urance of hi s fri endshi p and 
46. 
faith in McClellan, 
McCle llan ' s  ba se  of supply was at Whi te  Ho use , but he was not t o o  
42. Eckenrode & C onrad , p. 73,  
43, � .. p .  7 3 ,  
44, Ibid, , p. 75 . 
45. Ibid. , p. 74 
46. ill.£.' pp. 74-76. 
11 . 
happy about being divided by the s vrollen rive r ,  and discus sed the 
possibi litie s  of a change of base t o  the James River , with Ad.n1iral 
47 . 
Goldsborough of the Navy . In c onj unct ion with.this , McCle lla n 
ordered a re c onnaisance to the Jame s River to  open c ommWlications 
48 
with Federal gunboat s; this operat ion lasted from JLUle .3 t o  JLUle 7 .  
On June 8, 1862, Lincoln called off the chase of Jac ks on ' s  
49 . 
force s ,  free ing McDowell's forces for McClellan . On June 11 , 
McCl ellan was not ifie d. that the rest of McDowell's c orps (McCall's 
division had arrived by wat er on the 12th and 1 3th of June ) ,  would 
5 0 .  
j oin hi.m by c o.ming overland. McClellan wrote  Washingt on that due 
to the rain , the destruction of bridge s ,  the c ondition of the r oads , 
etc . , he felt McDowe ll should be sent to him by water , as it would 
51.  
be fast e r ,  and his plans would not allow further delay. The sa.:ne 
day that this dispatch was sent , an event began t hat was t o  increase 
McC lellan's fear for his supply line and his exposed right wing. 
From. June 12  t o  June 1 5 , the Confederat e cavalry officer , J.  E! B. St u­
art , rode his t roops c ompletely around the Union right wing with 
litt le oppos it ion , and ret urned to Richmond with the report of 
5 2 .  
McCle llan's e xposed right wing. 
On JLUle 14, McC le llan reported that the weather was favoraole 
47. Hassle r ,  p .  132 . 
48 . Ibid .  , p .  132 . 
l;9 . Hassler, p .  131. 
5 o. Michie , p .  317 .  
51 . IBid . , pp . 317 , .318 . 
52 .  Divided We Fought , p .  67 , & Eckenrode & C onrad , p .  77 . 
12 . 
and that he mi ght begin hi s move i n  two da ys . He adde d  that he felt 
he should be given f ull cont rol over t he for c es , including McDowell; 
5 3 .  
that in no other way c ould the se forc e s  be of any u se t o  him. He 
had moved his headquart ers t o  the south si de of t he river , and on  
June l? , he sent the following me s s age t o  the Pre sid ent : 
"Our army i s  well over the Chi cke.ho.miny , e xc ept 
the very considerable forc e s  ne c e ssary t o  prot e c t  
our flanks and communi c ations . Our whole line of 
pi cket s in front runs wit hin six mi le s of Richmond . 
The rebel line runs wi thin musket range of ours . Each 
has he avy supp ort at hand . A general engagement may take 
plac e any hour . An advance by us invo lve s  a bat tle more 
or less decisive . The enemy e xhi bi t at every point a 
re adine s s  to mee t us. They c ertainly he.V-e great numbers 
and exte nsive work s . If 10 , 000 or 15 , 000 men h ave l ef� 
Ri chmond to reinforc e Jacks on , it i ll ustrat e s  their strength 
and c onfidenc e . "  
5 4 ,  
On the same day , Lincoln repli e d ,  "If thi s i s  true , i t  i s  a s  good a s  
a reinf orc eme nt t o  you of equal for c e . I could better di spose of 
things if I could know abo ut what day you can attack Richmond , and 
would be glad to be info rme d if you think you can i nform me wit h  
5 5 .  
safety . "  Thi s was sent on June 18 , and on the same day McCle llan 
reporte d  that he had just received inf ormat ion from a Confederate 
deserter that troops were being s ent to Jack s on ,  and that the Ri c ·hmond 
5 3 .  Eckenrode &: qonrad , p .  7 '7. 
54 .  Ni colay , John G. , & Hay , John , :  Abraham Linc oln , A History , 
Vol . V, C entury C o . ;  New York , 1890 , pp . 417 , 418. Hereafter 
c it ed as Nic olay & Hay . 
55. Ibi d . , p .  417 . 
1 .3 . 
ga rrison was in great force .  Linc oln felt that this was a .move by 
the Rebels to  deceive t he Union forces , and he nade no changes in his 
56 . 
plans .  
While these eve nts  were taki ng place ,  McCle llan c ontinued t o  
work on his bridge s ,  report ing on June 15, that his work part ies had 
57 . 
been brought under enemy artillery fire . 
On June 20, McClellan sent a d ispatch telling of the great di ffi-
cul ties  caused by the weather and the terrain; that there was no 
reason to think t hat the enemy was thinking of giving up Richlllond , as  
he was in great force ;  and that he (McClellan ) was complet ing the 
defensive works on his side of the river .  He added that he  would be 
glad t o  se nd his ideas on the c onduct of the war throughout the whole 
5 8 .  
country. McC le llan had no right to  offer his vie ws on the rest of 
the military affairs , as  he had more than enough t o  do  before Richmond, 
and this did not help the feeling toward him in  Washingt on . It i s  
hard t o  say whether this was a bit of egotism on his part , or i f  he 
thought his views would be of some real help to the Pres ident .  McClelian 
was not happy with the pe ople in Washington because of the ir failure 
to  re inforce him. He did not fee l  that politic ians had any right t o  
interfere with mi litary affairs , but failed t o  realize that this was 
59 . 
a war with  great polit ical implicat ions.  His displeas ure was 
56. 
57 . 
58. 
59 . 
Eckenr ode ·& 
McClellan, 
Conrad , 
p .  40·1. 
Eckenrode  & C onrad ,  
p . 76. 
pp . 77 , 78 .  
Catt on :  This Hallowed Ground , p .  1.32 
14 . 
point ed out in a lett er to  his wife on June 22: " . •  I learn that 
Stanton and Chase have fallen out ; that llicDowell has deserted his 
friend,  Chase , a nd taken to Stanton .  Alas , poor country that should 
have s uch Rulers . "  He cont inued by explaining the strength of the 
Conf'ederates , and , " • • •  I will yet succee d ,  not withstand ing all they' 
do and leave undone in Washingt on to prevent it . I would not have on 
6 0 .  
m.y conscienc e  what those men have for all the wor ld ." 
When Lee took over the Confederate forces on June 1 ,  his fir st 
act was t o  c ont act McC lellan about obtaining safe c onduct for his wi fe 
and daughter fro.m behind the Union line s .  This was arranged ,  and the 
rece iving officer and the ladies were shown all c ourte sy b�r McCle llan 
6 1 .  
and his staff .  
Lee reali zed that he must force McCle llan t o  loosen his grip on 
Ric h.mond , as it was all-i.mportant to the C onfederate  cause at ho.me and 
6 2 .  
abroad . With the fall of Memphis , New Orleans , and Nashville , 
Ri chmond represent e d  the leading Southern city ,  as  well as the Capit ol, 
It was the c ore of the war producti on machine , and the main rail head 
for traffic t o  the west . If  the Uni on could capture Richmond , it  
63 . 
would win all .  Thanks to  St uart ' s  ride , Lee kne w  of the weakness of 
the Union r ight wing , and de c ided t o  attac k it as s oon as poss ible . 
On June 16 , he sent a letter to Jac ks on in which he told him t o  .maKe 
a fe int t oward the north , then  t o  proceed t o  j oin the forces at 
60. McClellan ,  p .  407. 
61. Hassle r ,  p .  130 .  
62 . Michie , p .  321 . 
63 . Catton: This Hallowed Ground ,  p .  128 
15. 
Richmon d as s oon as pos sibl e ,  and with secrecy. Jackson began his 
march on June 17 , reaching Port Repub lic on the 18t h. On June 19 , 
he was at Michum' s River Station , about ten .mil e s  we st of Charlott e s-
vil l e. He reach ed Gordonsville on June 21 , investigat ed a rumor of a 
Federal force on th e Rapida4and ,  found it t o  be 
hi s troops to meet with Lee , and arrived on the 
false , rode ahead of 
6 5. 
2 3rd. 
At the staff meeting on June 23 , Lee explained t he conclusions 
at which he had arrived. Richmond could not st and under a s i ege ; 
therefo re , it was nece s sary for the Confederat e s  t o  take  t he initia-
tive.  A direct as saul t on th e Union positi ons was out of t he question, 
as Lee ' s  t roops were ine xperienced and t he Union artillery t oo 
powerful. Thi s meant that !i turning n10vement woul d  have to be carrie d  
out , and thi s  was invit e d  by  the exp os e d  Union right flank. An 
att ack here would threat en the Union line of co.'llffiunication , and would 
66. 
require t he bulk of the Confederate force s. There were thre e 
things in t his plan that had to be  consider e d. First of all , the 
Union might hit Richmond while the bulk of the Conf e d e rate army was 
on the ot her side of the river. Seco nd l y ,  the Union position on 
Beaver Dam Creek wo uld be hard t o  hit directly. Thirdl y ,  the Union 
could dispute  the cro ssing of the Rebe l s  at the Meadow Bridge s and 
liiechanicsville Bridge , where Le'e wo uld have to cro s s  three of his 
6?. 
di vi si ens. 
64. 
66. 
67. 
Michie , pp. 3 24 , 325, 
Batt l e s  .and Leaders ,  Vol. II , pp. 347- 3 50. (D. H. Hil l  quote s  
Rev. R. r;:--nabney , D. D. ) 
Free.man , Vol. II , p. 110. 
Ibid. , p. 110. 
16 . 
Meanwhile, on June 18., McClellan IO.oved the rest of Franklin's 
VI Cor1)s a cross the Chickahominy to the· southwest side, to S Ufilller' s 
right. Thi s f onned a li ne f our mi les long, f rom Whi te Oak Swamp ,  
68. 
tb.rough G oldi ng 's Far,n, to the river. The Uni on troops were 
deployed as f ollows: Keyes' IV Corps at ·whi te O ak S wa mp; Heintz elma n•s 
III Corps to the ri ght of Keyes, on. the Viillia msburg T urnpike;  
Slllililer' s II Corps on the Ri chmond a nd York Rai lroad, to the ri ght of 
65 . 
Heintzelfilan; and Frankli n's VI Corps to the ri ght of S umner. This 
left Porter's V Corps, n orth of the Chi clrnho.m.iny, on the exposed 
right wi ng . On June 19 , McCa l l's divi si on rei nforced Porter, Federa l 
pickets were wi thi n four a nd one ha lf .mi les of Ri chrnond, the bri dges 
v1ere nearing COillpletion ; by June 20 , the Uni on army ha d 105 , 000 .men 
70 . 
present for duty, i ncludi ng non- co,nba ta nts. Porter's V Corps 
Vias dispersed i n  the followi ng ma nner: Meade's bri gade of McCal l's 
division wa s protecti ng New Bri dge f ron1 the Gai ne' s .  house wi th ad di-
tional reserves ; the bri ga des of Reynolds a nd S eymour were in rif le 
pits tha t ski r ted the ea st ba nk of Da,u, Beaver Creel(; Cookes' cava lry 
was ne[l.r Cold Harbor, protecti ng the rea r  a nd scouti ng nea r Ha nover 
Court House ; Morell was coveri ng the bri dge crossi n gs- -pi ckets were 
pla ced i n  Mechani csvi lle, a nd f i eld works were placed behi nd Bea ver 
7 1 .  
Daiil Creek . 
68. Ha ssler, p. 136 .  
69. Hassler, p. 1 30 .  
70. I bi d. ,  p. 137 . 
71. Ba ttles a nd Leaders, Vol. I I ,  pp. 325 , 326 . ( F. J. Porter) 
17 . 
On J une 24 , McCle llan le arned from a Confe de rat e de s e rt er that 
Jackson was moving from Gordonsville t o  Fre deric k s  Hall Station,  to 
hit the Union right and rear . He ordered Port er t o  detach troop s to 
Walnut Grove and Bethe sda C hurch, and to expect an at tac k by s upe rior 
munb ers . The re st . of the arn1y was safe in it s strong line south of 
7 2 .  
the Chickahominy.  · 
McClel l an wire d Stanton on the evening of J une 24 , that he hoped 
7 3 .  
to open on the Confe derate batterie s  the next .morning . He had 
ordered additional maps of the area to be made e arlie r  in the filOnt h, 
and , unknown to Le e ,  was n10ving some of his s upplies from. Whit e House 
74. 
to Harr ison ' s  Land ing on the Jam.e s River . McCle llan was doing 
all that was p os s ible t o  protect his army from. at tack. He d id not 
fear att ack f ro m. t he Re bels in Richmond, but he d id fear an attack 
75. 
from his right and rear . News of Jacks on ' s  approach corifirm.ed 
the se  f ears . 
Lee ' s  army wa s organiz ed  in the following manner for the attack 
on the Union forc e s :  J .  E .  B .  Stuart was t o  cover the l eft of his 
turn ing c o lumn with 1 , 800 men; the left turning c o l umn was composed 
of Jackson ' s  divis ion of four brigad e s ,  R .  S.  Ewe ll ' s  division of 
three brigad e s  and the "Maryland Line," and W .  H .  C .  Whiting ' s  
divis ion of two brigade s--for a total of 9 , 000 men. The left s up-
72 . Ha s sle r ,  p .  138 . 
73 .  Ibid . ,  p .  138 . 
74.  Ibid., p .  135 . 
75 . Battle s and.Leade r s , Vol .  I I ,  p .  325, ( F. J .  Port er ) .  
18 . 
porting unit was D. H.  Hill's division of 9, 000 men .  The center 
was made up of A. P .  Hill's division o f  14, 000 men , and Longstreet's 
div ision of 9, 000 men formed the left of the attacking units . The 
rest of ?ge army was left to de fend Richmond , with Magruder in 
. 
command . 
Until he received word of Jacks on's approach McClellan believed 
that he was still in the Valley ,  and Washington had no information 
77 . 
to give him as to Jacks on's move ments or location. 
Lee issued  Gene ral Order #75 on June 24 , 1862 ; this outlined 
the Confederate plan of attack for the 26 th .  Jackson was to 
approach the Union forces  f'ro.m the right and rear. As soon as he 
saw Jacks on's approach , Branch was to give the s ignal ,  and the 
attacking divisions were to move into action along their a s s igned 
route s .  Those near Richmond were to a c t  as if they were about to 
attack the Union forc e s  south of the river at any time , thus keeping 
reinforce ments fro m being sent to the Union right, and masking the 
true point of the attack . Jackson,  having the farthest to c ome ,  
was allowed to pick the time for the attack , and despite the warnings 
by Longstree t  abo ut his meeting roadblocks and skirmishers , Jackson 
78. 
decided on a time of 3: 00 A. M. , on the 2q'th day of June . 
While General Lee was . planning his attack,  McC lellan was also 
planning to open his attack on Richmond . He planned to extend his 
lines and take "Old Tavern , "  and pushing the Rebels back to Richmond , 
76. �Michie , 'P• 328 .  
77. Free;iman, pp . 116 , 117 . 
78 .  Official Records , Vol.  XI' part 2 ,  p .  498 . 
79. Catton: This Ha llowed Ground , pp . 137 ,  1 38 .  
19 . 
b ring up hi s heavy guns , she ll the c i ty,  and t hen car ry i t  by 
79 .  
ass ault . By the third week in  June , he had 15 0 , 000 men ,  but 
felt that with the arrival of Jacks on and Beauregard , the confederate 
BO . 
force numbered from 150 , 000 to 20U, OOO men.  
So it  was ,  on the eve of the seven Day ' s Battle s ,  both  t he 
A:rmy of the Pot o.mac and the A:rmy of Northern Virginia were planning 
to  take t he offense , each hoping to  beat the ot her to  t he fi rst  
blo w. 
80.  Catton :  Thi s  Hallowed Ground , pp.  137, 138. 
J 
• 
Puller 
BATTLE. 
Of 
MECHANIC5VlllE. 
0 100 600 JOOO YAlt-05 
1 .  Eckenrode & Conrad , p. 85 
�o 
I f. 
I uJ .Au.af/11 � (/) 
.� 
- Fe*r.-/ 
1IIIIIJ Con/ufc,.,,;k 
C HAPTER II 
On June 25 , th e Uni on bridges across  t he Chickaho.miny were 
complet ed . Rain was falling int ermitt ently ,  as  both Arfili es were 
2 .  
preparing f or the co.mi ng conflict . 
On the Confederate side ,  Jackson had ret urned to his troops 
and was on his way back toward the Chickaho.miny with them. Fi eld 
rations for three days were bei ng cooked, j ust as  Lee had ordered , 
and the vari ous units  were assembling at thei r  assigned positi ons . 
During the morning McClellan rec eived an answer to  his dispatch 
to Stanton of June 24. In the report Stanton told McClellan of the 
various rumors he had received in  regard to  Jacks on .  Som.e of these 
reports said that Jackson had 10 , 000  men , whil e  others reported 
h is strength at 40 , 000 ; there was som.e diff erenc e of opini on , al so , 
as  to whether Jackson was heading to Richmond or rema ining in the 
valley. Stanton indi cat ed that any of these could be false rum.ors 
sent out by the Confederates to mis lead the Uni on leaders,  but he 
felt that McClellan could not afford to ignore the possibilit y  t hat 
.3 . 
Jackson was headi ng for Richmond .  McClellan did not receive thi s 
di spatch unt i l  lat er in the da y,  as  he was busy in the vi cini t y  of 
Oak Grove ,  near Wi lliamsburg Road, He had ordered o. genera..i.. m.ove. 
2 .  Freeman , p .  118 . 
J. Official Records , Vol XI, part I ,  p .  49 .  
2i. 
by his picket lines in preparation for t he att tick un Old Tavern 
which was t ·o be uu June 26 . Hi entzelman ' s Corps was t o  accompli s h  
t :ii s advanc e ,  but had failed all day due t o  the heavy resi stance  
being g iven by  the Rebels , and the swampy c ondition of  the terrain .  
Mc Clel lan arrived t o  direct t he advance himself , and added Keyes• 
Corps t o  t he attack . By night fa ll the Union troops had advanced  
4 ,  
their picket lines  wit hin four .m.ile s of Ri ehm.end . Duri ng t hi s  
srune day ,  McClellan ordered a detachment of two cavalry regimen ts , 
t wo infantry regiment s ,  and one artillery batt ery from Porter's 
Corps , under General Stone.ma n ,  to  obstruct Jackson ' s line ·of march 
and delay hi s .movement s to ward Ri ch.m.ond . The y  were t o  acc o.mpllsh 
this by  blocking the road , destroying t he bridges over the Tolo­
poto.my, and by direct resi stance . Thi s  delaying act ion was to 
begin on June 26 , and it played an important role in the acti on 
5 .  
on that day. 
In order to cover the advance of t heir picket s ,  t he Union 
artillery opened on a wide front , north and sout h  of the river . 
6 .  
Lee knew t hat McClellan was planning to start hi s move the next day ,  
or shortly following , but he was already co..:nmitted to  the offense 
and was deter.mine d t o  carry it out . Tim.a wo uld be an important 
factor ; befo re t he next da y passed , e ither  ar.my could find itself 
on either the offens e  or t he defense . 
4, Has sle r ,  pp . 139-141 .  
5 ,  Mic hie ,  p .  311 . 
6 .  Free.man , p .  118 . 
McCle llan kne w tha t hi s right wing was in  a bad pos i tion,  and 
on June 2 3 ;  he had told Porter , "If you are a ttacked ,  be careful to 
state the com.positi on and position  of the enemy. The troops on this 
side wi ll  be held ready ei ther  to suppor t you di rectly  or to attack 
the enefily in their front. If the force a ttacking you is large , the 
general would prefer the la tter course , counting on your skill and 
the adin.irable troops under your command to hold the ir own against 
superior nUfilbers long enough to give him a c hanc e to make the de ci sive 
7 .  
filOVeme nt which  will de termine the fate of Ric hmond.  Instead of 
holding a positi on in  Mechanicsvi lle , Porter pulled the bulK of his 
Corps back to Beaver Dam Creek ;  i nto fortifi ed  pos i ti ons . Here the 
banks of the valley were steep and any approach ,  except the right 
8 .  
and rear , would be covered by heavy infantry and arti ller y fire . 
Por ter stated his reason for thi s c hange i n  Battle s � Leaders of the 
Ci vi l � : "We aim.ed to invi te a heavy a ttack , and then by rapid 
wi thdrawal , to i ncite such c onfidence i n  the enemy as  to induc e 
9 .  
incautious pursui t. " For the purpose of invi ting this attack,  he 
lef t a small force i n  the village .  The m.en in his filain body were 
ordered not to leave their  i ntrenchillen ts to pursue a repulsed attack , 
except where the arti llery could fi re over the ir he ads and cover 
10. 
them.. 
In the action a t  Oak �rove , Kearney's and Hooker's men had formed 
the line of advancing picke ts . In the course of moving to wi thin 
7 ,  Mi c hi e , p.  3 3 3 . 
8. Batt.les  and Leaders , p; 3 28 ( Porter ) .  
9 , Ibi d . , P• 3 27 .  
10. Ibi d . , p.  329 .  
fo ur mile s of Richmond, these  units passed Wi lli amsburg Road ,  
Seven Pines , crossed an open field, and entered a swampy woodland 
where wounded me n had to  be propped up against tree s to keep from. 
11 . 
drowning . Thi s was the t ype of terrain the oppos ing forces  
wo uld be  fighting over for the next few days . 
All al ong the Union li nes sounds of Confederates  on t he marc h  
were reported , and comm.ands could be heard in t he woods opposite 
their positi ons . All persons concerned felt t hat t he next day would 
12.  
bring the start of the deci sive batt le for Ri c hmond . 
Upon returning to  hi s headquarters , McClellan found Stanton's 
dispatch  of earlier in  the day, and replied  t hat he had received 
word that Jackson was ne&r Hanover Court House , that Beauregard had 
arrived in  Ri chmond , and t hat he expe cted to  be attacked on his 
right wing the next day . He expre ssed the belie f t hat he was going 
to mee t  great odds , and that he was not re spons ible for the dangerous 
posit ion of hi s army, as  he had asked for reinforcement s and explained 
hi s position to  the pe ople in Was hington without getting sati sfactory 
re sult s .  He added that he and hi s men would do t heir best , but a 
l) . 
resulti ng di saster could not be blamed on him. 
In regard to  the constant reque st for reinforcements by 
McCle llan , Lincoln had wired him , "I give you all I can and act on 
'the presumpti on that you wi ll do the best you · can with what you nave, 
whi le you continue ingenerously, I think, t o  assume that I could 
11. Catton , p.  1)4.  
12 . Ibi d. I p.  1 )5 .  
1) . Michi e ,  p .  3 29 .  
l'f 
14.  
give you more if I would ."  Eckenrode and Conrad feel that there 
were many troops i n  Northern Vi rgi ni a ,  and Eastern Virgi nia , that 
co uld have bee n sent to  McClellan , but Li nco ln  and Stanton feared 
Jackson in the Valley ,  and that Stant on didn't want to se nd him any 
troops.  The result of this was McCle llan's vulnerable position.  I 
tend to  agree with this opi ni on, but I cannot agree that the Govern-
15 . 
ment may have lost the war because of this, 
The end of June 25  fo und Porter's troops i n  the following 
positions: Seymour's and Reynolds' brigades ,  of Mc Call's divisi on ,  
were i n  a defense line of reinforced i nfantry and arti llery intre nch­
ment s ori Beaver Dam. Creek; Meade 's brigade was i n  reserve , and an 
infantry regime nt with an arti llery batt ery formed the advance 
pi cket s  i n  Mechani c svi lle ; cavalry unit s and pickets were watching 
Mec hanic sville Bridge , Meadow Bridge s,  and Atlee's Stat ion on the 
Vi rgi nia Central Railroad; ll'lorell's and Sykes' divisi ons were near 
Cai ne's Farm i n  support of McCall , and watching New Bridge whi le 
16 . 
formi ng McCall's link with the bridges over the Chi ckahominy. 
On the Confederate side of the ri ver ,  D .  H .  Hill and Longstreet 
mo ved from i n  front of Richmond to  the Ri ch.Bond si de of Mechani c s-
ville Bridge;  thi s was about two or three o'clock A. M. on June 26 . 
A. P .  Hill  was at the Meadow Bridges with hi s five bri gades whi le 
the rest of the attacking fo rce , save Jackson,  was under Branch at 
14 . Eckenrode and Conrad , p .  81. 
15. �-. p .  3 32 . 
16 . Michie , p .  3 3 2 .  
17 . 
Winston ' s  Bri dge . 
During the night of June 25 , Mc Clellan wi re d Stanton that he 
felt he would be att acked in the morning and that he was taking all 
poss ible pre cautions , again indicati ng that if he had as muc h a s  
one more divi si on ,  h e  could cease to worry about Jackson being oppo-
18 . 
site hi s flank . 
19 . 
Dawn fo und June 26 , 1862 , a fai r ,  pleasant day . After eating 
breakfa st,  Lee received word f'rom Jac kson that he w ould be lat e , as 
he ha d be en delayed in hi s advanc e ,  not reaching Ashland unt il the 
precedi ng evening . Fro.rn this point Jackson c ould not cross the 
Rai lroad bri dge until six o ' c lock A. M;, three hour s lat er than he 
had scheduled to arri ve . Jacks on also reported t hat hi s cavalry 
20 . 
pi cl(ets had been driven in and hi s wi re line s had b e en c ut .  
Stone.man ' s  men V'rere doing the ir j ob well ,  and Lee now feared that 
hi s plan had been di sc overed . D. E. Hill and Longstreet were moving 
their di vi s ions down the :Me chani c sville Turnpike , and by e ight 
o ' cloc k they were in posi t ion , the art ille ry having been sent ahe a d  
of their unit s .  Le e rode with them to their positions , �Yhi ch wer e  
21 . 
masked by- the hi lls south of the Chi ckahoriliny . I.!Ie chani c sville was 
in the cent e r  of the s c ene , an important c rossroads bordered by a 
half doz en residence s ,  store s ,  and a saloon . It had been treat ed 
ro ughly by both for c e s  in McCle llan ' s  approach to Richr,10nd . 'I'lle 
17. Mi chie , p .  332 . 
1 8 .  Ec kenr ode & Conrad , p .  80. 
1 9 .  Fre eman , p .  119 . 
20. Ibid . , p .  122 . 
21 . Freeman , p .  123 . 
land on either side of Mechanicsville was a rolling plain , bordered 
22 . 
by woodlands with an occasional clearing. 
On the Union side of the river , pickets were destroying the 
bridges over the Tolopoto.my and felling trees in Jackson's line of 
&ch. The result of this action was that Jackson did not reach 
Hudley' s Cor ner, three miles north of Porter's right until four­
thirty o'clock P. M. , and his troops were so exhausted that he 
decided not to continue in the day's action . McClellan, anticipating 
the attack, placed McCall's division on the east bank of Beaver DBJn. 
Creek; thus the Union line ran f rom the river on the left to a 
point beyond Mechanicsville Road on the right. These positions were 
23 . 
dug in, well placed, and well supported by the artillery. At 
noon on June 26 , the approach of the Rebels vms discovered and the 
pickets at the Meadow Bridges were driven back. Other pickets were 
24 . 
withdravm, as were the units in Mechanicsville. 
The odd thing about Jackson's delay was the fact that he 
assured Lee that his troops would be in position on time. Longstreet 
had cautioned him about the possibility of Union troops operation 
to hold up the advance of his troops , and suggested that a later 
tiae would perhaps be better . Jackson did not agree , and set the 
25 . 
time for the attack at daylight. 
22 . Freeman, p. 12 3 , 124 . 
2 3 .  Hassler, p .  142 . 
24 . McClellan, p. 414 . 
25 . Battles and Leaders, p. 347 ( D .  H. Hill) . 
At approxiinately two o'clocl( P. M., Jackson came upon som.e 
Union picKets and used his artillery to drive them off. This was 
26. 
misteJrnn for the signal for the attack by Dabney in his account. 
The Confederate infantry could cross at the upper part of Mechanics-
ville Road, but their artillery had to come by Ellerson•s Mill Road, 
Vihere McClellan had constructed an epaulment. Lee, who was fighting 
within a few fililes of his Capitol, had very little knowledge oi' the 
terrain over which he was to fight, while McClellan had used the 
weeks of waiting to become very fainiliar with this saa1e area. This 
27. 
advantage was important to the fighting in the entire Seven Day's. 
At noon Lee received reports that the Union troops were leaving 
their earthworks opposite the advanced Rebel i1ositions, and this 
28. 
report was confiriued at about three o' cloclc Everything had 
depended upon Jackso n's column; if Jackson didn't arrive, the entire 
attack might have to be called off. A. P. Hill, with three of his 
29. 
five brigades untried in combat, feared that the plan to save Rich-
£,1ond was about to fail, so he opened the attack at about three o'clock 
.30. 
P. M., by crossing at Meadow Bridge. This move by Hill triggered 
the rest of the offense. Anderson's briGade, which had drifted too 
far to the left, was directed against the Union right; Field was 
hitting the Union right center, and Archer moved on the Bethesda 
26. Battles and Leaders,' D. H. Hill quoting Rev. R. L. Dabney, p. 350. 
27. Eckenrode & Conrad, p. 8 1. 
28. Freeman, pp. 126 , 127. 
29. Official Records, Vol. XI , part II , p. 839. 
JO. Michie, p. 333. 
Road to carr y the crossing ther e. Mea nwhile, Pender was 1noving 
31 . 
with the ar tillery tow ar d  the E llerson' s Mill Br idge . 
Rea liz ing tha t A.  P .  Hill wou ld meet with disaster if he wen t too 
far without Jaclrn on, Lee s ent Lt. Thoma s \Y. S nyder ,  of the Four ti1 
Virg inia Cavalry, to ha lt H il l  after he r eached Mechanicsville. 
S nyder either failed to r each Hill, or Hill chos e to ignore the or der . 
Whatever the case, Hill pushed his tr oops towards Beaver DaEl Creek , 
As th ey left the village, they wer e met by heavy Union ar tillery 
f ir e, but flushed with an easy push through the vill age, they wer e 
32 . 
d etenn.ined to go on. At f our 0 1  clock P .  M . , D. H.  Hill's tr oop s 
had crossed and wer e  climbing the hill to Mechanicsville; but 
Riply's ar tiller y  was held up at the destr oyed br idges, and lost a 
and 
At f' ive o'clo ck , Lee rq de into Mechanics vill e 
3 4 , 
fou nd chaos every where, The Confeder ates had no cover fr om 
the deadly ar tiller y  and r ifle fir e from the Union p ositio ns, and 
the Rebel gu ns seemed to be ha ving little effect on the Unio n 
p ositio ns. Despite th is, A .  P .  Hill's men k ep t  up their attacks on 
the enemy, atte.:;:ip ting to carr y them by d irect a ssault. Guns, hor ses, 
ride r s, and infantry were strewn over the field, and had not the 
U ni on ar tillery been a little too high; the entire division might hav e 
3 5 .  
been destroyed. Up on his arr ival, Lee also fou nd President Davis, 
of the Confeder acy, on the scene vri th sever al of his aides , Davis 
3 1. Mi chie, p .  334 , 
32 , Fr ee.man ,  p .  1 2 8. 
3 3. I bid, , p .  1 2 9  
34 . I bi d. , p .  1 30 
3 5 .  I bid . , pp . 130 , 13 1 .  
J.q . 
had fol l owed the a tta cki ng colUin ns i nto the vi llag e  a nd was wa tchi ng 
the ba tt le wi th grea t i nteres t. Lee was a nnoyed tha t a m.a n of Da vi s '  
importa nce to the Confedera cy sho ul d thus expo se him.sel f • .  Ri di ng up 
to Da vi s, he sai d, "Who a re all this arm.y of p eop l e  a nd vrha t  a re 
t hey doi ng here? " to whi ch Da vi s repli ed, 1 1I t i s  not my army, G enera l "  
and L ee sai d, "I t i s  certa i nl y  no t m. y  ar.ny, Mi ster P resi dent, a nd 
thi s  i s  no p la ce for i t. "  Da vi s sug gested tha t i f  he wa s to lea ve, 
36 . 
the peop l e  wi th hi m might fo l l ow, a nd so l ea d  the pa rty from da nger. 
Lee the n turned hi s a ttenti on to the battl eground, sent Ripley to 
forc e  the Uni on l eft, as the Uni on p osi ti on coul d onl y  be carri ed 
37 . 
by a turni ng movemen t; Ri p l ey f ai led to de nt the Uni on p osi ti o n. 
The Co nfedera tes fai led i n  several . a ttacks at ei ther end of the 
Federal p osi ti on, as well a s  those directed a t  the Unio n cente r, bei ng 
repulsed wi th heavy l osses . Ripl ey's bri gade had been the o nl y  one 
of D. H. Hi ll's di vi si on to comple te the crossi ng of the ri ver, so 
the bulk of the atta ck fel l on the di vi si ons of A.  P. Hi ll a nd Long-
3 8 .  
st reet. 
At the hei g ht of the ba ttl e, m.en of the Fi rst North Caroli na 
Cavalry a nd the Forty -Four th Georgi a Regi ment were not l ed i nto the 
attack properly, hi tti ng too fa r to the l eft. They raced dow n the 
hi ll i n  ful l  f a ce of the Uni on arti ll ery a nd trie d  to cross the 
c reek a nd clL:nb up the other si de. Due to the poi n t bla nk fi re, they 
39, 
failed i n  thei r a ttemp t, a nd l os t  hea vi l y .  Aga i n  and agai n, the 
36 , The Bl ue a nd the G ra y, Edit ed by Henr y S teel Comm.ager, Vol . I ,  
Bobbs-Merri l l  Co. , I nc. , New York a nd I ndi a m p ol i s, 1 950 , 
pp . 135 , 136 . Hereaf ter ci t ed a s  Comm.ager. 
37 .  Off i cial Record s, XII ,  part I I ,  p. 33 6 . 
3 8 ;  F reema n, p. 1 3 3 .  
39 . I bi d, , p .  1 34 
Confederates tried t o  take the Union posit ion,  and did not stop the 
frontal assault s until  night fell . The bulk of the attack had been 
at Ellerson 1 s Mill . Lee had not wi shed to  make t his  di rect a s sault  
on such a strong position , but A.  P.  Hill had committed him to  it ; 
t hus the first time Lee commanded t he Army of Northern Virginia ,  he 
40 • 
.met with defeat . 
With the coming of darkness ,  the remains of Pender' s and Ripley ' s 
brigades , which had att empted to for c e  the Union left at Ellerson ' s  
iull , pull ed back  a few hundred yards . The infantry acti on ended 
about nine o ' clock P. M . , but the arti llery co ntinued to fire unti l 
41 . 
after t en 0 1  clock P. M . , i n  so.me part s of the line . Por'ter had 
not been seriously hu.rt at Beaver Dam creek , whi l e  the Confederat es 
had lo st heavily,  Jackson had fai led in  hi s all-important role, and 
Lee ' s plan had lost it s element of surpri se,  fo r McCl ellan could 
4 2 . 
now perceive his enemy's plan . 
Of the 56, 000 men Lee had on the north s ide  of the river ,  only 
about 14 , 000 of them had gotten into the day's fi ghting , and of 
4 3 ,  
t hes e, approximat ely 10 per cent were lost . The Confederat es 
had us ed t wenty-one regiment s and ei ght artillery batteri es against 
Porter ' s  eleven regimen t s  and s ix batt eries , losing 1 , 589  killed and 
wounded to the Union's t ot al loss of 361 men. The Forty-Fourth 
44 , 
Georgia lost 335 men alone . The bat tle  had ended in a c o stly 
defeat for the Rebels , but McCl ellan was now on the defensive. 
40 , EckenrOde & Conrad , p .  87 . 
41 . Freemen , p .  1 34 .  
42 . Ibid . , p .  1 35 . 
43 •  Ibid . , p .  13 5 ·  
44 , Battles  and Leader s ,  p .  33 1 ,  footno te by edit or s .  
1 1 . 
-1:£ .  
In Battle s and Leaders of the C ivil War ;  D. H. Hill had the 
following co.mments to .make on the Battle of Mechani c sville { or 
Beaver Dam Creek , ) "We were lavi sh of blood i n  tho s e  days , and it 
wa s tho ught to be  a great thing to charge a battery of artiller y  or 
an earthwork lined with infantry . • • The attacks on th e Beaver Da.m 
intre nchment s on the heights of Malvern Hill at Gettysburg , etc . , 
were all grand , but of exactly the kind of grand e ur whi ch the South 
could not afford . "  He also sai d , "Our engineers s e em to have had 
li ttle knov'lle dge of the c ountry , and none of the for ti fi cati on on 
the c reek . The maps furni shed the di vis ion c o.m.manders were 
4 5 .  
worthle ss !' 
45 . Battle s and Leader s , p .  3 52 .  
1 .  .Ecke lJ.r ode &; Conrad , p, 95 
CHAPTER III 
GAINES MILL 
De spite the fact that the Fe deral fo rc e s  hc-..d rep11lsed Le e ' s  
1 -� ' 
attack on J une 26 1 McC lellan was det er.wined ·t o c.?·mple t e  hi s change 
of bas e , fro m White House t o  the Jam.e s Riv er . All �uring the 26th ,  
Magrude r had kept up the pretens e o f  being i n  st rong riwnbers on 
the so uth · s i de of the Chi ckahominy ; thi s ,  a l ong with the attack ot 
June 26 , and the knowledge that Jackson was to Port e r ' s rig�t and 
rear , caused McClellan to g ive up his strong po siti on on Beaver Dam 
Creek.  He f e lt that he coul d not take re inforc e ments frofil in frout 
of Magruder ' s  and Huger 1 s  t roops and pla c e  the s e  men at the d i s-
. 2 .  
posal of Port e r ,  to us e i n  prot e ct ing hi s ri ght flank from. Jack s on .  
Before the attac k  of J une 26 , McCle llan had started t o  move m.uc h 
of Port er ' s  heavy e qui pme nt a nd s uppli e s  t o  the rear in antic ipati on 
of hi s change of stat ions . Thi s was c arri e d  o ut de s pi t e  the fact 
that many o f  hi s offic ers r eport e d  that the Confederat e s ' positi OllS 
on the south si d e  of the river were deserted,  on the morning of 
June 2? . McCle l l an was on the defensive and would not ri sK an 
attti.ck on the f ortifi c at ions of Ri chmond against the enemy he be lieved 
3 .  
to outnumber him..  Every m.ove McCle llan m.ade during t he Seve n 
4 .  
Days ' was based on t he ti. s s um.pti on that he ·was out numbere d .  On the 
2.  Catton : Thi s Hallowed Ground ; p .  il,o . & Ha s sler , p .  145 . 
J. Cat t on :  Thi s Ha.ll ov;ed Ground ; p .  140 . 
4 . Wi lliams , T .  Harry , Linc oln and Hi s General s , Alfred A. Knopf , 
New York , 1 9 5 2, p .  11 9 .  C i t e d  hereafter as T .  H. Wi lliams . 
26th , McClellan t old one pf hj.s 90.mm.and ers that he was planning t o  
beat the C onf ederat e s  in a showdown fi ght , but a s  they had attacl<:ed 
him , they must outnumb e r  him.. Hi s int elligenc e servic e re porte d  that 
5 .  
the Rebels had 180 , 000 men on J une 26 . 
In re gard to th e fight i ng on June 26 , M·J C.le llan reported , i n  a 
telegram me ssage t o  Stant on ,  "Vi c t ory today Cl>m.ple t e  and agai nst great 
6 . 
odds . I almost begi n t o  think we are invincible . "  Later McCle llan 
notif i ed Washington that he was changi ng hi s ba se of.  operat i ons t;o 
the Jame s ,  adding that the y  were not t o  worry if they did not hear 
from him f or a few days . He also expr e s s e d  an opinion that all the 
troops in the Valley and in the vi cini ty of Wa shingt on should be 
place d  und e r  one c o.mm.and . Unknown t o  McClellan; Lincoln had done thi s 
on the previous day,  plac ing John Pope , a man McClellan was t o  come 
to hate s e c ond only t o  Stanton , in cofilfiland . Pope had been under 
Halleck in the west and was a pugnac i ous , c onfi dent man whose repu-
tati on had developed through his own boast i ng .  Pope was to operate 
east of the Valley and draw Conf ederat e t roops f rom the Richmond area , 
the n tu·rn toward t hat city and turn hi s c ommand over t o  McClellan upon 
his arrival , . Thi s  plan was shattered by Le e ' s  offen se , and Pope d i d  
not want McC lellan t o  change h i s  base because h e  fe ared that t h e  Army 
of Vi rgini a  under him ( Pope ) would be e ndangere d ; it was too lat e ,  
8. 
McCle llan had already started to .make the c hange . 
During the nigh t s  of J une 26 and 27 , the bulk of Porter ' s  heavy 
equipment was mov e d  to a new position on the s o uthwe st banl<: of the 
5 ,  T .  H. Williams , P •  119. 
6 .  Ibid . , pp . 122 , 123 . 
7 ,  T .  H .  Wi lliams , pp . 119, 120 . 
8 ,  I b i d . , p .  121 , 124. 
3'f 
Chic kaho.mi ny . Thi s was done ski llfully and y,ri t hout the knowledge of 
9. 
the Confederate s . McClel lan was det ermined to fight a rear guard 
acti on , with the Fifth C o rp s  to cove r  the change of base by hi s main 
army . Thi s was t o  be in the are a  of Gaines Hi l l .  Meade ' s  and 
Griff in ' s brigade s were the fi rst t o  pull bac k ,  covered by Seymour ' s  
brigade and Captains Robert son and Tidball ' s  hor s e  art i lle ry . Thi s 
withdrawal was gradual ; wi th a f ew skirmi she s and a few c l o s e -
followi ng Rebel s ,  but the bulk of t h e  Conf ederat e f'.or ces d i d  not 
10 . 
appear befo r e  th e new Union posit ions unt i l  noon on June 27 . 
The new Uni on line was a convex affair whi ch followed the l eft 
bank of Boat swain Cree k ,  and covered Woodbury ' s ,  Duane s ' , Alex-
ander • s  and Grapevine Bri dge s ,  Tree s had been felled and rifle pit s 
had be en dug , but the pos i t i on was too long f or the nlliTiber of troops 
11 . 
on hand t o  occupy i t . The s i ege guns were t aken from New Bridge 
and placed on the south bank of the Chickahominy unde r  the prot e cti on 
of Frankli n ' s Corp s .  T o  the front o f  the Fede ral pos iti on th ere was 
a swam.p ground , c overed by the arti l lery and i nf antry posit i ons , as 
we re the approaches on the roads from Gaine s Mi l l  and Old Cold 
Harbor . Each bri gade had two regiments in re s erve , to it s ifilfilediate 
rear , and the guns we re placed betwee n  the brigade s wherever p o s s i ble . 
Hunt ' s  art i llery was under the cover of the t imber t o  the left rear 
of the posit i on ,  and ready to move t o  the s upport of the f o rward 
9. Has sle r ,  p .  146 .  
10. McClellan , p .  415 . 
11 . Hass le r ,  p .  146 . 
troops at a .m.o.m.ent ' s  noti c e , Morell and Syke s for.m.ed the fir st 
line of d e fense--Morell on the le ft and S yke s on the ri ght , wit h  
McCall for.m.ing the s e c ond line i n  the c enter r e ar . Port e r ' s head-
1 2 .  
quart er s was made at Adam' s house . General Cooke ' s  cavalry was 
to pro t e ct the left flank , and had orders not to le ave i t s  position 
in the river valley under any circ U111stanc e s  and to hold all strag-
1 3 .  
gler s .  Gene ral Stoneman ' s  force , whi ch had done a great j o b  in 
keeping Jacks on o ut of t he f ight ing on the prev i ous day , was not 
avai labl e ,  a s  he had b e e n  ordered t o  Whit e House ; from ther e he was 
1 4 .  
t o  re j oi n  the army a s  soon as po s s i b le . Porter was det e rmined t o  
hold thi s pos it ion and allow the rest o f  the army t o  c o.m.plete i t s 
1 5 .  
withdrawal , even though he f elt he was outnumbered three to one . 
He held hop e s  of receivi ng t ime ly ai d from the main body of troops , 
16 . 
cri ppl ing the Confederat e s , and t urning back upon Ri chmond.  
General Le e expected to find the Uni on forces in a position at 
Powhit e  Cree k ,  and began hi s move , after di scovering the Union for c e s  
had l eft Beaver Dam. Cree k .  A .  P .  Hi ll and Longstreet were under way ,  
using the r oads toward Glendale , at nine o ' cl ock a . .m. .  on June 27 . 
Jac!rnon was t o  take Powhite Creek and fa ll upon the Union flank a s  
17 . 
Hi ll and Longstre e t  drove the enem.y befo re them . D .  H. Hi ll was 
taking the Bethe s da Chur ch Road t o  j oin Jackson . The purpose Lee had 
1 2 .  Battl es � Leader s ,  Vo l I I , pp . 332- 33 5 ,  ( Porter)  
1 3. I b i d . , p .  335 ,  ( Porter )  
14.  I b i d . , Vol II , p .  33 5 (F .  J .  Port er ) 
1 5 . Michi e ,  p .  340. 
16 , Bat t l e s  and Leaders , Vo l I I , p .  336 ( F .  J .  Port e r )  
17 . Free.man , p . . 141 
in mind wa s t o  unmask New Br idge in order t o  gai n c ommuni cat ions 
between the C onf ederat e s  on the north side of the Chi c kahom.iny and 
18 .  
those o n  the south s i d e  o f  the ri ve r .  Whi le moving toward Old 
Cold Harbo r ,  D .  H .  Hi ll hit the Uni on forces  ne ar t he re , on the road 
linking Old C o ld Harbor with Grapev ine Bridge . Lee knew nothing of' 
19 . 
th i s  engagement unt il m.uch later . When Lee had dis c overed the 
Uni on posi t i o n ,  he fo und the y  were in an east-we st line at Boat swain 
Cre e k ,  not the no rth- south line on Powh ite Creek as he had expec t e d .  
Thi s  posit ion was stronger than the one he had e xpected t o  find , and 
2 0 . 
hi s map s  did no t show it . Lee ordere d  A .  P .  Hi ll t o  attack Porter ' s  
front , Longstreet to hit the Union left , and D .  H .  Hi ll and Jac k s on 
2 1 .  
to hit the Uni on right and rear . Porter saw t he approach of the 
large enemy fo rc e  and felt that he would ne e d  reinf orcement s , so  he 
sent Gene ral Barnard t o  ask McC l e llan for them . Whe n Barnard arrived 
at McCle llan ' s  headq_uarter s , he found the Gene r al asleep and ,  instead 
of waldng him to giv e  him the reque st , he left and returne d  to hi s 
ovm q_uarter s for a r e st . As . a  re s ult , McC le llan did not know of' 
Port er ' s nee d  unt i l  two o ' c loc k p . m .  Barnard also  failed t o  s e nd the 
22 .  
axe s Port er had a sked for i n  order t o  bui ld hi s defense s .  
By noon of J une 27 , Porter was deployed a s  follows : Syke s wa s 
on the r ight with hi s divi sion of regulars ,  between Old Cold Harbor 
and New Cold Harbo r ,  on the roads leading to Barker ' s  Hi ll . More ll ' s  
18 . Batt l e s  and Leader s ,  Vol . I I , p .  35 3 , (D .  H. Hi l l) 
19 . Freeman,  pp . . 142 , 143 . 
2 0 . Ibid . , pp . 144 , 145 .  
2 1 .  Has s l er , p .  146 . 
2 2 .  I bi d . , p .  146 . 
divi s i on was on the le ft , south of the New Cold Harb or road . McCaLL 
was in re serve , behi nd More ll . General Phi lip St . Ge orge Cooke ' s  
2 3 .  
CD.Valry wa s on the extreme left , near the Chi c kaho.mi ny . 
A .  P .  Hi ll appeared abo ut noo n ,  with Long st reet on hi s ri ght , 
t oward the Chi c kahominy . Onc e again Jacks on was tardy , as he had 
been he ld up by r oad b locks manned by sharpshoo t er s , s o  A. P. Hi ll 
24.  
delayed attacking and he ld Long stre et back . At t wo-thirty o ' c lock 
p . m . , A .  P .  Hi ll ordered hi s men f orward from the woods south of 
Gaine s Mi ll and C o ld Harbor Road . As they svvept down toward the 
25 . 
front , the y were me t by t e rrif ic fire from the Fede ral po sit ions . 
Hi ll was hitt ing Mor e l l  with 1 3 , 000 men ;  yet each a dvance was be ing 
rep ul s e d .  Longstree t came up on Hi ll ' s  ri ght , only to be rep ul s e d  
by More l l ,  v<ho was be ing a i de d  by :McC.all . To ai d i n  this defense , 
Fra.nklin ' s s i e ge guns vmre hitt ing the Confederate advanc e s  from 
' 26 . 
acro s s  the ri ver . At abo ut four o ' clock , Slocum ' s divi sion 
arriv e d  in t ine to n1o ve forward wit h  McCal l ' s  d ivi s i on as it was 
27 . 
he lpi ng to repul se the attacks of Hi ll and Longstreet . By fi ve 
o ' c lock , the re peat e d  att acks by Long street and Hi l l  had been repulsed 
and the batt le l ooked like a deadlock . These front al att acks wer e  
ne c e s sary , and i f  t h e  Uni on po si tion were not broken , the bat t l e  
2 3 .  Has sler , p .  l47 . 
24 . I b i d . , p .  14 7 ,  
25 . Free1nan,  pp . 146 , 147 . 
26 . Ha s s ler , p .  1 4  7 .  
27 . Ibid . , p .  148 . 
would be a defeat f or the Confe derat e s .  To aid Hi l l ,  Lee se nt Whit e ­
head ' s  d ivisi on ,  but t he Confederat e s  were sti 11  ke pt e.t bay . Federal 
2 8 .  
batt eri e s  had full play o f  the fie ld of batt le . Jackson f ina lly 
arri ved on the fie ld and , see ing Hi l l  and Long st reet in diffi c ult y ,  
he struc k  Syke s '  di vis ion with f our divi si ons c f  hi s ovm , but he 
could not fo rc e the pos iti on . Port er again calle d for reinforc ements ,  
but Magruder , the o ld act o r ,  foo led Mc Cle ll an int o  thinking he was 
about t o  be hit b y  a lare;e enemy f or c e , and McC l e l l an t emporari ly 
de layed s end ing addi ti o nal men to Po rt e r . Magrud er was holding 
D. H. Hi ll 55 , 000 Yankee s  
and Jacks on had 
29. 
i n  posi t i on wit h  30 , 000 ·1:�erat e s .  
j oi ned on A .  P .  Hi ll ' s $�, e xtend ing the line 
beyond McGe�hee House . They were thinking of for ci ng Syke s '  f r om hi s 
pos it ion b ut they _ were t o  hold their posit i on with o ut being able t o  
advanc e .  
During the c o ur s e of the a c t i o n ,  the Rebels had capt ured a gun 
posit ion near McGe ehee ' s ,  only t o  have the Sixt eenth New York Regi -
ment re ca pt ur e  i t . The fi ghting over this batt ery see- sawed back and 
JO . 
forth thro ugh mo st of the day. When SlocWll ' s  d ivi s ion arrive d ,  the 
Uni on r e s erve s had bee n us ed up and hi s divis ion was split up and put 
where i t  vras .mo st nee de d .  Taylor ' s  brigade f illed the gaps i n  Mor e ll ' s 
div i s ion , Bartlett ' s  went to Syke s ,  and Newt on ' s  went to the r ight 
28. Battl e s  and Lea ders ,  Vol ,  II , p .  363 .  ( E .  M .  Law , C . S . A. ) 
2 9 .  Has s l er , pp . 148-1 5 0 .  
30 .  Battl es � Leader s ,  Vo l .  II , p .  36 3 .  ( F .  J .  Port er ) 
81. 
3 1 . 
of Griffin ' s  brigade of Syke s ' divisi on . At 6 : 30 ,  the C onfeder-
at es att ac ked once more aft er a half-hour lapse i n  f ig hti ng , only to 
be re p ulsed onc e more , The Union for c e s  hoped that this was t he 
32. 
last att ack , as ni ght was upon t h em .  E .  M .  Law, i n ·  charge of 
the right brig ade of Whi t ing ' s  divisi on , formed hi s men i nto two line s 
of batt le and began to advanc e through the Uni on fi re • .  I n  the f i rst 
line he had Col . Lidde ll ' s  Eleve nth Mi s s i ss i ppi Regime nt , and the 
Fourth Alabama under C o l . McLemore . In the s e cond line he had Col . 
Stone ' s  Sec ond Mi ssis sippi , and the Sixth North Caro lina under Col . 
Avery. The s e  uni t s  forme d the ri g ht port i on of hi°s att ack.  On the 
left , the f i r st line was ma de up of th e Fo ur th Texas and Eighth 
Georgia und e r  Hood . The First and Fifth Texas were f o rme d in the 
3 3 , 
woods t o  t he left of t he attacking fo rce . The s e  t roops advanc ed de s -
pite the heavy f i re from the Union pos iti ons . As the y moved at a 
trot do wn the slope toward the Union posi ti ons , the art i l lery f i re 
c ut large gap s  in their line s . The y advanced at a double time t o  
within thirty yards ,  witho ut firi ng a shot , then rush e d  the Feder1::1.l 
posit i ons in the ravine . When they got ·wit hin t en pace s , the Unio n  
troops b roke , carr ying thei r s e c ond line with them, Porter was c ut 
in two , wit h Law and Hood t o  the re ar of hi s c e nt er .  The Reb e l s  
poured heavy fi re i nt o  t h e  masse d  Uni on t roops , causing heav;)T c a sual-. 
3 4 ,  
ti e s ,  and t he y  c apt ure d  fourt een Uni on fi eld pie ce s . It was 
31 . 
3 2 .  
3 3 ,  
34 . 
Batties 
ill£. ,  
I bid . , 
and Leader s ,  
p .  3 3 9 ,  
p .  36 3 .  ( E .  
Fre eman , p .  l.55 .  
Vol .  I I , p .  363 . ( F .  J ,  Port e r )  
M .  Law) 
duri ng thi s attack that Cook;• s c aval ry mov e d  t o  stop the Confe derat e 
advanc e , a s  Longstreet and Jackson were j o i ning it , and charged t he 
advanc ing Rebels , onl y t o  be hi t by fir e  from his own t roops , a s  we ll 
as that of t he C onf ederate s .  Hi s attack was b roken , the retreat ing 
me n and hor s e s  rode thro ugh the very p o s iti on s t hey had hoped t o  
35 . 
defend , leading t o  a great amo unt of conf us ion . 
By thi s t ime ( 7 : 00 P .  M . ) ,  all t he Confederat e s  wer e  moving for-
ward , and Jack s on and Longstreet j oine d the .main attack . D .  H. Hi ll 
took the McGe�hee hous e a s  the Fourth Texas broke the Uni On cent e r , 
36 . 
and Ewe ll was j oining t he f inal attack . As the Fourth Texas .mo ved 
upon the last Union batt ery ,  a wounde d Uni on c annone er pulled him.s e l f  
u p  b y  t h e  spoke s o f  the gun ' s  wh e e l  and fired int o  t h e  f a c e  o f  the 
37 . 
advanci ng e nemy . Syke s '  di vis ion was f alling back i n  good orde r ,  
and Fre nch and ll•Ieahg e r  were arr iving from. McCle llan i n  t i.me to stop 
38 . 
the Confe derate advance and cov e r  the r e t re at of t h e  Union troops . 
Three thing s  played a role i n  McClellan ' s  fai lure t o  send rein­
forcement s t o  Port er earlier in the day • .  The first of the se was 
Barnard ' s  failure to not ify McClel lan of Port er ' s  nee d  in the morni ng . 
The s e cond was Magrude r ' s a c t i ons , whi ch lead McC l ellan t o  beli eve 
he was about to be attac ke d  him.s e lf . The t hird fact or was the re sult 
of a natural pheno.ro.ena . Due t o  the woods b etwe en Port er and McCle llan 
and the atmo spheri c c ondit i on s  of the day, Mc Clellan was unab le to hear 
35 . Bat t l e s  and Leaders , p .  364 . · { E .  M. Law) 36 . li're e.ma n , "Vol .  II , pp . 155 , 156 . . 
37 . Battle s and Leaders , Vo l .  I I , p. 346 . { Rev . w .  H .  Hi tch c ock ) 38 . Eckenrocie & Conrad , p ,  93 . 
39 . Catton , Thi s Halloweu Ground , p .  142 . 
the so und o f  b att le from Port e r ' s po si tion , eve n tho ugh he was not 
I 40 , 
far fro.m wh ere the fighting t ook pla:c e . 
I 
Longstree t ,  in Batt l e s  and Leaders , d i s c us s e s  the t errain over 
i 
whi ch the fi ghting t oo k  pla c e  and t he Union p o s iti ons : "In front of 
me the ene.my occ up i e d  the wooded slope o f  Turkey Hill , the c re st of 
which i s  f if t y  o r  s i xt y  feet hi ghe r than the plain over which my 
troops .must pas s  to ma ke an attack . The plain i s  almost a quarter 01· 
a mi le wi de ; the f arther si de vms o c c upi e d  b y  sharpshoot e rs . Above 
these,, and on the slope of the hill , was a line of i nfant.ry behind 
tree s felled so a s  to forio. a , good breastvmrk . The c re st of the hill , 
some forty feet above the last li ne , was strengthene d by ri fle t re nche s 
and o c c up i e d  by i nfant ry and art i llery.  In addi tion to t his , the 
plain was i nfi l t rated by batt eri es on the other s ide of t Qe Chi cha -
hominy . I wa s ,  in fac t , in the very position from which the ene.my 
41 . 
wished us t o  att ack hi.m . " 
During the ent i re course o f  the day ,  the Sixt e enth and TVventy­
Seventh New York Regiment s ,  the Fifth Maine , t he Ninety-Sixth Penn­
sylvania Volunt e ers , Kingsbur y ' s regular bat ter y ,  and Col . J. J .  
Bart lett ' s  re giment held the ri ght und er Syke s '  c om.uand unti l the 
• '  42 . 
Union c e nt er was for c e d .  D .  H.  Hi,11 ha d occasion t o  renew s ome old 
ac quai ntanc e s ,  b ut t he s e  were unde r  awkward c ondi ti ons .  At nine 
0 1  clock P .  M . , he found Maj o r  H .  B .  C l et z ,  U . S . A. , whom · he had known 
40 . Batt le s and Leader s , Vo l .  II , p .  )65 . ( John B .  DeMo lt e ) 
41 . Ibid . , p .  354 , ( D . H .  Hi l l )  
42 . Ibid . ,  p .  3 5 5 . ( Syke s '  Repor t ) 
in the Mexi c an 'lfla r ,  a pri sone r and wounded . I n  the morni ng General 
john F .  Reynolds , U . S . A . , an old me ssmate of hi s from the old army , 
was brought in a s  a pri sone r .  I f  thi s wa s not e nough , Syke s ,  the man 
he fought aga ins t  all th rough th e da y ,  was hi s roo11'.lID.ate •vhe n  the two 
were at We s t  Point . On learni ng thi s ,  he informe d Syke s ,  thro ugh till 
offic e r  negotiating for an exchange of pri sone r s , that had he known 
Sykes was hi s oppone nt , he would have sent s ome of hi s North Carolina 
boy s  to take him in  out of the c o ld . In r eply to thi s ,  Syke s sai d ,  
111 appreciate the sarcamn , but our time wi l l  be next and the table s  
4 3 .  
wi l l  b e  turned .  11 
Whi le the Battle of Gaine s Mi ll was going on,  a l e s s e r  fight wa s 
taking place at Garnett ' s  Farn1 , on Nine Mile Road . Late in the eve ning 
of June 27 , thi rty rebel arti llery pi e c e s  opened fire on I-Ia.l).c ock'  s 
brigade of "Ba ldy" Smith' s divi si on , VI Corps . Hancock r e turned the ·  
44 . 
fi re , si lenc e d  the Re bel  g uns a nd late r repul sed  an infantry attac K .  
One o f  the mo s t  contraversial po rti ons of thi s battle was the 
action of Coolce ' s c ava lry in the ir attempt to s top the Confede rate 
breakthrough .  Porte r has the follov:ing statew.e nt to make in Battle s  
and. Leaders : "We lost in all  twenty- two cannons ; soI:ie of these  brolce 
down whi le we we re withdrawing , and so.me ran off the bri dges  at 
night whi le we were cro ssing to the south bank of the Chi clrnhominy . 
The l o s s  of the guns wa s due to the fact that some of Cooke ' s  c avalry 
43 . Battle s a nd Leaders , Vol . I I , p .  354 .  ( D .  I-I. Hi ll ) 
44.  Has sle r ,  p .  149 . 
which had been di re c t e d  t o  be  kept under a l l  c ir c umst ance s  in the 
valley of t he Chi ckahomi ny , had been s e nt t o  r e s i st an attack of the 
enemy upon our left . The charg e exe c ut e d  in  the fac e of a wit hering 
fire of i nfantry and in the mi ddle of our heavy cannonfire , as we ll 
a s  that of the ene1D.y , resulted , as s ho uld have be e n  expe cted , in  c on-
f llsion . The bewi ldere d  and unc ont rol lable hor s e s  wheeled about a.n d ,  
dashing thro ugh the batteri e s ,  sat i s fi e d  the gunne rs  t hat they wer e  
charged by the e nemy . T o  th i s  al one I attri but e  t he fai l ure on our 
part t o  hold  the bat tle fie l d  and to bring o ff all o ur g un s ;  with f ew 
except i ons , it was an order ly re treat . Most unaccountably this cav-
alry was not us ed  t o  cover o ur re treat or gather st raggl ers , but wa s 
pereinpt orily orde red to c ro s s  t o  the south bank of the river . I 
45 . 
neve r again saw th eir c Ofilffiander .  n 
In defen se  of Coo ke ' s  cavalry , t he Com.t e De Pa ri s ,  who was wi tn 
McC le llan ' s  staff , wrote  to Cooke in 1877 , sayi ng that the cavalry had 
46 . 
done all i t  c ould to s t op the Confederate advance .  To support 
Port e r ' s stor�' , Rev. W. H. Hit c hc ock , who took part i n  the c harge , 
wrote in  1885 , that whi le the charge did split to the ri ght and left 
47 
of the batt ery,  it di d go t hro ugh the bat tery after it v:a s repul se d .  
Brevet Lt . Col . J .  P.  Martin c laims t hat Port e r ' s  lo s s  would have 
48 . 
been greater i f  it h ad not been for t he cavalry charge . E .  ·M .  Law , 
C . S . A. , says Port e r  wa s mi st aken a s  to the ro ute  that t he cavalry 
49 . 
took in the charge . Regardle ss of whether Cooke ' s  c ha rge ai ded or 
45. Battl e s  and Leader s ,  pp . 340 , 341 .  {Port e r) 
46 . �· , p-:--)45 . (Cooke ) 
47 . I b id . , p .  346 . 
48 . Ibid . ,  p. 345 .  
49 . Ibid . ,  p .  364 , 
( C ooke ) 
{ Cooke ) 
( E .  M .  Law ) 
hindered th e Uni on d e fens e , the fact r e.niains that they were o rd e red  
not to leav e the ri ver v all e y  under any c i rc umst anc e s . Because of 
the charge , Hunt ' s  art ill ery , whi ch was i n  position to advance t o  the 
aid of t he Uni on front , was unabl e  to be brought up . Cooke ' s  troo p s  
had def ini t e l y  gone agai nst their orders by maki ng t he c ha rge and did 
so without warning to the r e st of the Uni on f or c e s . 
Part of th e r e ason for the heavy f i re inf li cted upon A. P .  Hi l l ' s  
division on June 27 was the use .of  the new breach l oading r ifle s in 
the hands of t he r egL'llent under Berd;an . The s e  were the Sharp ' s  breach 
loading rif l e s  and they were abl e to de liver a great er rate of fire 
with le s s  danger of wounds to the ri ght arm and shoulder whi le re loading .  
50 .  
The se r i f l e s  were put t o  good us e thro ughout t he ent i re Seven days . 
' 
Under cover . of darkne s s , McCle llan began pulling hi s forc e s  back. 
across the Chi ckahom.iny . Between nine and ten O ' c lock P .  M. , Gener.:..ls  
Lawt on and D.  H .  Hi l l  of  t he Conf ederacy went o ut t o  insp e ct the 
Uni on lin e s  alone . The y  got wit hin t hirty yar d s  of t he Union posi ti ons 
and w ere .mi stake n for a party of Union troops t hat had be en sent t o  
l!cGee hee ' s  for wat e r .  They met thi s party on thei r way back , but 
there was no exchange o f  wo rds . As Hi ll says , 11At such t imes , s i l ence  
5 1 .  
i s  golden . " 
Mc Cle llan wa s c rit i c iz e d  for not t ak i ng the offense on June 27 , 
bat he b e li eved he was o utnu.nbered . Al so , if  Porter could hold a 
hasty posit i on again st great od ds , could not Magruder have held the 
well-prepared posit ions  of Richmond agai nst simi lar o d ds a s  well? 
50 . Bruce ,  pp . 204 ,  205 . 
51 . Battl es and Leaders , p .  3 5 8 .  ( D . H.  Hi l l ) 
Grant mis se d  a sim.i lar opport unit y  aft e r  Cold Harbor i n  1864 . These 
are not my opinions al one , but t he y  are a l s o  expre s s ed by Has s l e r , ' 
5 2 . 
¥rho quotes volume II of Pari s '  The Civi l War .  The r e s ult of t he 
acti on on J une 27 was t hat McCle llan wa s forced to pull all hi s 
forc e s  to the s o uth s i de of th e ri ver and ,  if Lee wi she s t o  c ontinue 
to f ight , he woul d have t o  re cross the r i ve r  with hi s .mai n  body. 
Le e tho ught that the Uni on s uppli e s  were still at Wh ite Ho use , as 
he was i gnorant of McCle llan having s e nt hi s supp li e s  ahe ad of him. 
to Harr i s on ' s  Bar on the Jam.es River . By morning all o f t.he V Corps 
5 3 .  
had s afely c ro s s e d  the rive r .  
The loss e s  o f  June 27  wer e  h eavy o n  bot h  side s .  Porter had 
abo ut 25 , 000 effective s ;  of these t here were 894 ki lled , 2 , 836 
mi ssing , 3 , 107 wounde d ,  for a t otal of 6 , 8 37 m.en lo st . The Confed­
erate s  l o st a t o tal of 8 ,  751  ki lled and wounde d  of an a ttacking f or ce 
5 4 .  
of about 57 , 00U . The Fo urth Texas f ini sh ed the day under the 
command of a cpatain , as all i t s  fie l d  of fi cers had been ki lled or 
5 5 , 
wounded ,  and t he Fi rst Texas lo st 600 of it s 800 .men .  
As t o  Porter ' s  st ubbo rn r e s is t ance o n  June 27 , D .  H .  Hill says , 
"Ge neral Fit z John Porter , who command e d  t he Federa l s  at Cold Har b or , 
handled hi s 40 , 000 .men wit h  an ability uns urpass e d  on any field 
56 . 
dur ing the war . "  
Hi ll was mi st ake n abo ut th e number of t roops at the d i s posal of 
Porter , whi ch only adds to the p rais e he g ive s Port e r .  
52 , Ha ss ler , p .  105 . As c it e d ,  Par is , The C iv i l  War , Vo l II , p p .  108 , 106 
5 3 .  IBid . ,  p .  149 . 
54 , -:-roid . , p .  149 . 
55 . Freeman ,  p .  157 .  
56 . Batt l es � Leade r s ,  p .  359 ,  ( D .  H .  Hi ll ) 
1 • Eckenrode & C onrad ' p .  103 
CHAPTER IV 
During t he night of J une 27 , Mc Clellan not ified his 
commanders at Savage Station that he had decided to go thro ugh 
with hi s change of b a s e  to the Jame s River . Thi s required t he 
moving of an army of 85 , 00 0  men ,  25 , 00 0  ho rses and mules , and 
2 5 , 000 t ons of s upplie s ove r  di ffi cult t e rrain . All of thi s  wa s 
crammed between the Chi ckahaminy and Whi te Oa,k S'wrunp , and had t o  
2 .  
be got ten over t he bot t le-neck at Wh it e Oak Bridge . McCle llan 
had two thi ngs i n  his favor . First of all , . Le e ' s  army , or at 
l ea st t he m j or por t ion of it , was on t he north s i de of the Chi ck­
ahominy and had t o  cro ss over the bridges that had been de stroyed 
by t he Union army . S e c ondly, Lee was mi st aken in bel ievi ng t hat 
McClellan would r e new the fi ght t o  regain hi s bas e  of s upply at 
3 .  
Whit e  House . 
The withdrawal of the A:rmy of the Pot omac t ook the a ppearance 
of a has ty retreat , wi th i t s  r ight in dang e r  o f  at tack from Rich-
mond and it s rear expo s e d  t o  t he north . In viewing the hardship 
he f a c e d  and the bat tle of t he day b efore , McC le llan sent hi s 
f amous Savage Stati on Di spat ch , dat e d  12 : 20 A. M. , J une 28 , 
whi ch rea d :  
2 .  · · Ha s s l e r ,  p .  150 
3 .  � • •  p. 1 5 0 .  
"I now know the full hi story of the day.  On thi s  side 
of the r i ver ( the right bank ) we re9ul s e d  s eve ral strong 
attacks . On the left bank o ur men did all that men could 
do , al l that so ldi er s  c ould acc ompli sh , but they were 
overwhe lme d  by va stly superior number s ,  even afte r  I 
bro ught my la st re serv e s  i nto act ion . The loss on both 
s i d e s  i s  t e rri ble . I beli e ve it wi ll prove to be t h e  
m.o st desperate batt l e  of the war . The s a d  remnant s o :f  
m.y men behave a s  m.e n .  Tho s e  batt alion s  who fo ught m.o st 
bravely and s uff ered m.o st are still i n  the best orde r .  
My regulars were superb ; and I c ount upon what are l e:ft 
t o  turn ano� her battle in company with the ir gallant 
comrade s of 'the . volui:it eers . {lad I twenty t ho usand 
( 20 , 000 ) or eve n t e n  thousand ( 10 , 000 ) :fre sh troops to 
use t omo rrow ,  I c o u ld take Richmond ; but I have not a 
man in re serve , and shall b e  glad to c over m.y r etreat 
and save the mat e ri al and per s onnel of the erm.y . 
"I:f we have lost the d ay we have yet pre served our 
honour , and no one ne e d  blush for the Army of the 
Potomac . I have l o st t hi s  battle because m.y :f or ce 
was t oo small . 
"I again repeat that I run not re spons ible :for thi s , 
and I say it wit h the e arne stne ss o:f a ge neral who feels 
in hi s heart the l o s s  ui· ;;: -.re ry brave man v11ho has need­
l e s sly sacri:fi c e d  toda y .  I s t i ll hope t o  retri eve our 
fortune s ; but to do this the governm.ent must v i ew the 
.matt er in the same e arne st l i ght that I do . Yo u .must 
s e nd .me very larg e rei nf o rce.ment s and send them. at 
onc e .  I shall draw back to the other s id e  of the 
Chi ckaho.mi ny , and think I can wi thdraw al l our material . 
Ple ase und erstand that in t his batt le we have l o st 
nothing but .men ,  and t ho s e  the best we have . 
"In addi t i on to what I already said , I onl:ir wi sh t o  
s a y  t o  the Pre sident that I thi nk h e  i s  wrong i n  
regarding .me an unge ne rous . when I sai d  that m.y f orce 
was too weak. I me re ly int imat e d  a truth whic h  to day 
has be en too plainly proved . I f , at thi s instant I 
c ould d i s po s e  of t e n  thousand ( 10 , 000 ) fre sh m.en , 
I could gai n  the vi ctory t omorrow. 
"I f ee l  t oo earne stly t onight . I have seen too 
many dead and wounde d  c omrade s t o  feel otherwi se than 
that the g overnme nt ha s not sus tained thi s  army . If 
you d o  not do so now ,  the ga.me i s  l o st . 
"If I s ave thi s army now , I t e ll you plai nly that 
I have no thanks t o  you or any othe r pers ons in Wash­
ingto n .  You have d one yo ur b e st to sacrifi c e  thi s  army . 
4 .  McC le llan , pp . 424 , 425 . 
4 .  
The last two paragraphs of this di spat ch were de leted by 
two men in the tel egraph off i c e  before Stanton received it . Des ­
pite th i s ,  Stant on le arned of t hem; yet he made no c omment abo ut 
5 .  
th em..  
Regardless of whether McClellan was right o r  wrong , thi s di s­
patch was fooli sh , d i s r e sp e ctful , and bord e re d  on i n s ubordinati on .  
Mc Cle llan al so wrot e hi s wi fe o n  June 28 , saying , "The y have 
o utnumbered us everywhe re , but we have n ' t  lost our honor , This 
army has act e d  magnifi cent ly .  I thank my frie nds in Washingt on f o r  
6 .  
o ur r ep uls e .  11 
All dur ing J une 28 McClellan di rected the c hang e of base and 
the movement of hi s t roops . Lee th o ught McClel lan would try t o  
regain Whit e Ho use a s  �a s previ o us ly me nti one d , o r  r etreat t o  
We st Point or Wi lliamsburg , He se nt troops down the left bank o f  
the Chi ckaho.w.iny t o  c ut the c o.m.m.unicati on l i ne s  o f  t he Union army , 
and intercept the enemy retreat at Bott oms Bridge and the Rai lroad 
Bridge . The s e  troops found not hi ng e xc e pt the smoldering pi l e s  of 
suppli e s , whi ch had bee n fi red b y  the retr eat ing Uni on forc e s  whe n 
t hey could n ' t take t h em with the.m .  I t  was lat e  in the evening 
7 .  
befo re Lee realized McC le ll an ' s true moveme nt s and inte nt i o ns .  
In the ear l y  afternoon of J une 28 , the C onfederat e s  hit 
W. F. Smith ' s  divi s ion of the VI C o rps near Gol di ng ' s  Far.m. These 
were lead by Col . Ge orge T .  Anderson , and were dri ven off after a 
8 .  
stubborn fi ght . Earl i e r  in the day , McCl ellan had .moved Smi th ' s  
5. Has sler , p .  l52 . 
6 .  McC l el lan , p .  442 .  
7 . Hass ler , p .  1 5 3 . 
8 .  �- . pp . 1 5 3 , 154 .  
4T 
divi s i on t o  the rear and l eft o f  the c learing at Gol ding ' s ,  wi th 
9 .  
Slo c Wil  being pla c e d  to t he rear and ri ght of S.mit h.  
Duri ng the .mor ning of June 28 , Vl'hi te Oak Br idge was reb ui lt , 
and a new one wa s construc t e d  at Brac ke tt ' s Ford , The form.er was 
the b e st of th e  t wo , and i t  was over t hese two bridge s  that t he 
10. 
Uni on wagons and arti ll ery had to c ross Whi te Oak Swamp . 
The po s i tion of the VI Corps was re lat ive ly the s ame a s  it 
had bee n ,  with S.mith st i ll on the ri ght , t o  the Chi ckaho.mi ny ;  t o  
the le ft of McCle llan ' s  di vi sion.  S l o c um. was at Savage stat i on in 
re se rve , and Sumne r ,  Hi ent zelma n , and Keye s wer e  to cross the swam.p 
11 .  
at onc e . McCl e llan placed Keye s '  C orps on the so uth side of 
t he swamp , wat chi ng t he Federal cross ing and the Confederate 
approache s  from. Ri chmo nd on the Q,uaker , Charl e s  City , Darbyt own , 
and Hew Ma�ket Roads . Porter ' s  V C o rps ma rche d a c ro s s  t he swrun.p and 
12 • 
.moved t oward Malvern Hi ll ; it was to be f o l lowed by Keyes . The 
mov e  was well masked and aided when Keye s d is covered an old road 
whi ch ran parall e l  to the Q,uake r Roa d .  Thi s road was opened f or 
th e Uni o n  t rains a nd s pe eded t he wi thdrawal of t he ar.m.y consi der-
13 . 
ably.  To give hi.ms e lf an e xtra day t o  c ompl et e  t he wi thdrawa l , 
McCle llan t o ld S umner ,  Hi ent z e llllan , and W.  F .  Smit h t o  reDE. in nor t h  
of t he swamp , ne ar Savage Station and the Ri chmond Roads . Slocum ' s  
di vi si on of the VI Corps was t o  re li eve the IV Corps on t he night 
of June 28 , s o  t h e  t he IV C orps c ou ld foll ow Porter t o  Malvern Hi ll . 
When Lee f ound out ab out McCle llan ' s  move , it ·was t o o  late to at tack 
9 .  Batt l e s  and Leader s , Vo l .  II , p .  369 .  (Franklin ) 
10 . Ha ssler , ---P:- 154, 
11 . Batt les and Leaders , Vol .  II , pp . 367 - 369 .  
12 .  Hassler ,-P:- 155 .  
13 . . Bat t l e s  and Leade rs , Vol II , p .  370 ( Franklin ) -
14.  
on June 28 . 
5 0  
The only acti on on  June 28 was a sKirmish at Di spatch Station . 
The Confede rate Ninth Cava lry , supported by Ewe ll ' s  division and 
Stuart ' s  main bo dy, were order ed to capture the York River Rai lroad , 
When the cavlary reached  Dispatch Stat ion , the Yanlcees  retreated  to 
15 . 
the sout h bank of the river , destroying the bri dge after them 
During the rest of the day and night of t he 28th , McClellan was 
conti nuing his  wit hdrawal and sett ing up a defense line north of 
the swamp . The new line was two mile s clo ser to  Whi te Oak swarup 
Bridge and parallel  t o  the old line , three-fourths of a mile in 
front of Savage Station , whe re 2 ,  500 si ck  and wo unded Union troops 
16 . 
had been gathered . The hospital was in a c leared field of s everal 
acre s on the north side of the rai lroad . South  of the railroad and 
between it and the Willi6.111sburg Roa d ,  there was anot her c learing , 
and east of i t  a ravine whi ch ran obli quely across the railroad. 
This r avine was half filled with undergrovrth .  The c learing itselt 
l? . 
was a s quare abo ut a half mile l ong on each side .  
Rain and fog helped  to conceal the Union movement s during the 
morning of June 29 ,  and by afternoon 5 , 000 wagons and a herd of 
18 . 
2 , 5 00 beeve s had cro s sed  t he swa.m.p . During thi s ti.file Lee 
received wo rd that the Union forc e s  had left Go lding ' s  Farm., and he 
decided that McC lellan was making for t he James River .  To  be  s afe , 
he he l d  Ewell and St uart in  pos iti on to guard the bri dges on the 
14. 
15 • 
16 . 
17 . 
18 .  
Battle s � Leaders , Vol .  II , p .  370 . 
Off ic ial  Records ,  Vol . XI ,  . part II , p .  
Battles and Leaders , Vol .  II , p • .  370 .  
Ibi d. , pp . 371,  372 .  ( Fra;nklin )  
Has sler , p .  155 . 
{Franklin ) 
493 , 
( Franklin ) 
Chickahominy i n  case Mc Clellan made f o r  the peninsula. . Lee knew 
that it wo uld be imposs ible t o  hit McC le l lan ' s .ma i n  body before 
June 20 ; the refor e , t he next ma j o r  batt le would have to be on the 
30 th .  McCle llan would have to cross White Oak Swamp . If Le e c ould 
hit the Uni on rear g uard he might be ab le to c ut pa.rt of the main 
1 9 .  
body off and fi ght a ma j o r  engageme nt o n  t he 30 t h .  
With these tho ught s in mind , L e e  set up the fol lowing moveme nt s 
f o r  J une JO : 
( 1 )  Ewe ll was t o  remai n at Bott oms Bridg e .  
( 2 )  St uart was t o  wat ch the lower pa ssage s of the Chickahomi ny . 
( 3 ) Jacks on was to re build t he Grapevine Bridge and ,  in t he 
absence of ot he r  instructions , he was to c r o s s  t he bri dge 
and mov e  d ovm the right bank of the Chi cka.hominy , support ­
i ng Magruder and moving against the enemy wi th all spe e d .  
( 4 )  Magruder was t o  pur s ue t he Fede ral re ar down the Willi ams­
burg Ro ad and engage it before it r eached White Oak Swamp .  
( 5 )  Huge r  was to fo llow the Charles C ity Roa d and take t h e  
Federal flank at ·whit e Oalc Swamp , o r  before i t  reache d 
the s wamp . 
( 6 ) Longstree t ,  in charge of his own and A .  P. Hi ll ' s  d ivi sions , 
was t o  cross the Chi ckahominy at New Bridge , take t he 
short e st rout e to the Darbyt own Road , go down it t o  a 
position on the Long Br idge Road , and int ercept the Uni on 
20 . 
re t reat to the Jame s . 
1 9 .  Freeman , pp . 166 , 167 .  
20 . I b i d . , pp . 168 ,  169 .  
Mc Clel lan had move d h i s  he adquarters  to the so uth si de of White 
2 1 .  
Oak Swamp and t he Federal troops had pulle d out o f  t he woods near 
Fair Oaks , taking new positi ons at Allen ' s Farm , near Orchard St ation , 
22 . 
about two mi l e s  we st of Savage stat i o n .  Dur ing t he morn ing ,  
Magruder realiz e d  t hat the prey wa s getting away and he was determi ned 
2 3 .  
to strike t he Union rear guard . Sum.ner saw that Magruder was 
getting too c lose  to the Uni on wi thdrawal and de c id e d  to fi ght a 
delaying action at All e n ' s Farm . He plac e d  Ri cha rd s on ' s and Sedg e ­
v1i c k '  s divi s ions o n  a line no rth o f  t he rai lroad ; and Hi entzelm.an ' s 
24.  
I I I  Corps c onti nued that line so uth o f  the rai lroa d .  Magruder 
opene d hi s att ack ab out nine o 1 clock A. M.  by movi ng on b.oth si de s 
of t he Willi amsb urg Road , the l!lain part of his attacl{ hitting where 
25 . 
Sedgewi ck ' s an d  Ri chardson ' s  divi si ons j oined.  The C onfede rat e s  
26 . 
made t hree fur i ous front al attack s ,  only to be r e pul s e d . During 
the att acks , the Fift y-Thi rd Pennsylvania Regime nt playe d an impor-
t ant part in the re pulse of the Conf ederat e s  and earned the prai s e  
27 . 
of McCle llan . Thu s ,  Magrude r  had been he ld at arm ' s length and 
Sumner fe ll back t o  Savage  St ation as ordered .  Thi s was nec e s sary 
because Jackson mi ght have cros s e d  a nd mena c e d  t he Union rear g ua rd 
28 . 
at Savag e Stati on at any time . Upon re achi ng savage Stati on , 
Sum.ne r t ook a posit ion to the l eft of Frankli n ,  on a line fac i ng we s t ,  
between the railr oad and Wi lliamsburg Road . Hi entze lman was t o  
fo rn1 Slunner ' s  l e ft , who se posi ti on was behind a sl ight ly ri si ng plaln , 
21 . Ha s s le r , p .  156 . 
22 .  Ha ssle r , p .  156 . 
2 3 .  Ec kenrod e & Conrad , p .  101 .  
2L, • .  Ha s s le r ,  p .  156 . 
2 5 . I bid . ,  p . 15  7 .  
26 . Ibid . , p .  157 . 
27 . Offici al Re oc rds , Vol. XI ,  part II , p .  6 2 .  
28 . Hass le r ,  p .  157 . 
29 . 
but he mi s understood hi s order s ,  and wa s moving acro s s  t he swamp .  
Jack s on wa s onc e again dela ye d  in re bui lding Grapevine Bridge , 
and d id no t a rrive to hit Sumne r ' s  r i ght and r e ar a s  had been anti -
3 0 .  
ci pat e d .  
Vfui le t h e s e  e vent s wer e  t aking place , Lee le arned that the 
Uni on s tor e s  at  Whi te Hous e had been set t o  the t or c h  and the home 
31 . 
of Ma j or Ge neral Wi lliam Henry Fit zhugh Lee had been destro ye d .  
word al s o  arrive d o f  T .  H .  H .  Holme ' s divi s i on havi ng cro;: sed  to 
the north s id e  of t he Jame s over pontoon bridge s ;  and it ��s moving 
down New Mark et Road.  Thi s .me ant 6 , 000 men would soon j oin Lee and 
3 2 .  
wo uld help compensate for t he los s e s  re c e i v e d  a t  Gaine ' s !Jli ll . 
At a pproximat ely four o ' c lock in the aft ernoon , Frankli n and 
Sedgewi ck inspe ct ed the hospital at Savage Stat i on ,  and rode out 
to fi nd Hientzelman . They fa i led to find Hi ent z e lman ,  b ut the y 
sp otted troops l eaving the woo d s  north of t he railroad and recog-
3 3 .  
nized them to be Conf ederat e s .  
The ma in attack began at abo ut five o ' c l o c k ,  and t he Conf eder-
at e s  �ucc eeded in piercing the Uni on line t hro ugh Burn ' s  brigade , 
which was s tret c hed  on a line to the rai l r oad . However , the Uni on 
forc e s  struck ba ck and the Confederat e s  wer e repulsed in their 
re peat e d  attacks . To c o ver the s e  a ttacks , Magrud e r  us e d  a 32-pound 
34 . 
gun m.ount ed  on a ra i lr oad car , called the "Land Me rrimac " .  J!"roJll 
29 . Off ic ial Re c ords , Vo l .  XI ,  part I I , pp . 5 0 ,  5 1 , 99 . 
3 0 .  Battl e s  and Leader s , Vo l .  I I , p .  401 . ( Longst reet ) 
31 . Freeman , p .  172 . 
32 .  I bi d . , p .  172 . 
33 . Eckenrode & Conarad , pp . 103 , 104 . 
34 . Has s l e r ,  p .  15 8 .  
five o ' cl ock t o  ni ne o ' c l o c k ,  th e Confe derat e s  were repul s e d  i n  
t he ir r epeat ed attac ks . At the hei ght of t he battle , McCle llan arr i ved 
on the fi e ld a nd d i re c t e d  the f i re of grape an d cani ster shot into 
the re b e l  l i ne s .  S e e i ng t hat Sumner ' s  positi on c ould be he ld , he 
3 5 . 
ret urned to hi s he adquart e rs .  
Hient zelman ' s III Corps had r ea c hed t h e  Charl es C i t y  Road a ft e r  
mare .bi ng down Q.uake r Roa d .  Thi s  was about s ix-thirty o ' clo ck P .  1'! . 
The act i on at Savage Stat ion had a l l owed the Union Ar£n.y to get a go od 
start ahead of the Confederate s ;  however , a r ep o rt of a c avalry ski r-
mish at Wi l l i s  Church r e ve al e d  to McC l e llan t hat t he e nemy knew t he 
di r e c t i on and nat ure o f  hi s move , and w e re c lo si ng in on his rig ht 
36 . 
fla nk and rear. 
As the day c l o se d ,  Lee bel i eved that he c ould head McCle llan off 
at the i nt e r s e c t i on of Long Br i dge Road and Charl e s  City Road , at a 
place c alle d Ri dde ll ' s  Shop . Thi s was impos s i bl e ,  a s  the space d i d  
not permit f or t he huge wagon trains and the known r ear o f  the Uni on 
37 . 
forc e s .  Stua rt was ordered t o  cro s s  the Chickahominy and t o  coop--
era t e  in an att a ck where the hea d of the Uni on column was ass ume d t o  
38 . 
be . 
The r e st of the Conf ederat e  fo r c e s  had made poor progr e s s  i n  the 
advanc e .  A. P. Hi ll . and Longstreet had reached At l e e ' s  Farm , on the 
Darbytown Ro ad , j us t  thi rt e en mi le s from thei r  starti ng point . Magruder 
had wai t e d  for several ho urs for the arrival of Huger and Jackson ; 
35 . 
36 . 
37 . 
38 . 
Hassl er , p .  1 5 8 . 
Ibi d . , p .  1 5 9 . 
Freeman , p .  172 . 
I b id . , p .  172 .  
-
then he had been stopped at Savage Stat ion. Huge r had been c onfus e d  
ov e r  the d i s pat ch of t roo ps t o  and f r om Magruder and , ; be li eving 
that the Uni on for c e s  were on hi s flank in Whi t e  Oak Swamp , he 
bi vouacke d  at Brightwe ll ' s .  The r e sult wa s t hat Lee ' s  mai n for c e s  
' 
had not c ov e r e d  t he ne c e s sary gro und , and McCle llan had anot he r day 
.3 9 . 
to compl et e h i s  wit hdrawal over the swamp . 
At ten o ' c l o ck P .  M . , the Army of Northern Virginia was sit uat e d  
a s  follows : A .  P .  Hi ll was j ust behind Long street o n  the Darby-
t own Road ; Holme s was assume d t o  be even with t hem on the New Mark et 
Road ; Huger vias slight l y  ahead on the Charl e s  City Roa d ;  Magrud er was 
on t he Wi l l i amsburg Roa d ahe ad of Longstreet ,  but behind Huger ; 
Jack son was a s s ume d t o  be on Magrude r ' s left f lank ;  and Ewell was a t  
4 0. 
Bott om ' s Bri dge . 
Le e heard from General D .  R .  Jone s ,  of Magruder ' s  divi si o n ,  that 
Jacks on had sent vro rd that he couldn ' t  help at Savage Stat ion , a s  
41 . 
he had other i.mportant dut i e s  t o  perfor.m. What thi s other dut y  
was ha s never rea ll y  b een e stabl i she d ,  but there i s  reason t o  b e li eve 
that Jacks on had d e c i ded t o  give his t ro ops a r e st ,  and di d no t r ush 
the re bui lding of t he bridge s .  
Lee be li eved he c ould still stop the c ompleti on of the cro s s i ng 
by the Uni on t roops and was determined t o  stri ke t he se forc e s  on 
June JO , If Jackso n could c ro ss Whi t e  Oak Swamp and get behind the 
Uni on ar.my , Holme s could cover the extre.me r ight flank whi le Long-
39 . Free.ma n ,  pp . 172 , 17.3 . 
4 0 .  Ibid . , .map on page 175 . 
41 . Offic ial Re c ords , Vol .  XI ,  part II , p .  625 , 
42 . 
stree t ,  Huger , and A.  P .  Hi ll hi t the enemy from the flank .  
Holm.e s was to mov e to a po siti on near the Junct ion of Long Bridge 
and the New Market Road ; Magruder was t o  come from Savage stat i on 
and operat e as t he g eneral  re se rve ; A .  P .  Hi ll and Long street wer e  
t o  hi t t he enemy when and where t h e y  f ound him ; Huger was to open 
wi th hi s art i llery wh en he made c o ntact ; Jackson, Whiting ,  and A. P .  
Hi ll wer e  t o  c ro s s  Whi t e  Oak Swa.UJ.p and hit the Union rear ;  Stuart 
was t o  j o i n  the .main army a s  soon as p o s s i bl e ;  t hi s  ent i re move was 
to be made at dawn , and Huger was to give t he s igna l f or the at tacK: 
43 . 
as  he was the c los e st . 
Late that night Magrud er a sked  Lee fo r r einforc ement s in c ase  
44 . 
Jackson fai led to arr ive , but Le e refus e d  t o  s end t hem..  Duri ng 
the night pre parat i o ns fo r t he next day ' .s moveme nt s were planned 
by both s i de s .  The Fi fteenth Ma s sac hus ett s regiment fired the 
rai lroad bridge with a burning ammunit i on t rain , thus de stroying t he 
ammunit i on and t he br idge whi l e  co vering the Union retre at at that 
4 5 .: 
point . 
42 . 
. ,43 . 
44 . 
45 . 
Freeman , p .  176 . 
Off ic i al Re cor d s , Vo l .  XI ,  part II , p .  495 . 
Ibi d . , p .  66 5 .  
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CH.API'ER V 
June JO ,  186 2, was a ho t ,  sunny day , and one of criti cal i.mpor-
2 .  
tanc e to McClellan .  In the early morning the · Uni on forces were 
completing their crossings at Whi te Oak Cro ss ing ,  and at ten o '  cl o cK 
A .  M . , Franklin ' s Corps burned White Oak Bri dge .  The Uni on army was 
st rong from the swamp through to  t he Ja.mes River ,  and sti ll vulnerable 
J .  
to attack by  the Army of Northe rn Vi rginia .  
Lee , being conc erned over Magruder ,  rode t o  Savage Station to  see  
that al l was wel l .  Upon hi s arrival he fo und that Jackson had j oined 
Magruder at thre e-thirty o ' clock A. M. , and all se emed to be in 
readi ness for the coming day . It is  not known what t rans pired between 
Lee and Jackson , except that after sp eaking brie fly with Jackson ,  
Lee rode off .  He then gave instructions t o  Magruder before ridi ng to 
Darbyt own Road to f ind Longstreet . He arrived at the j unction of 
Longbr idge and Darbytovm Roads ,  j ust before noon , only to find Long­
street was not pre sent and placed A. P .  Hi ll in charge of the unit s 
4 .  
there . 
During this peri od of ti.me , McClellan was placi ng hi s r ear g uard 
in po si tion .  W. F .  Smith and Rich ardson ' s  uni t s  ·were at White Oak 
Swamp to kee p Jackson fro.m crossing. The III Corps ; Slocum ,  Sedge­
wi ck , and McCall ; were c overing t he three road3 approaching Quaker Road 
from the west . The V Corps was covering Malvern Hill  with the Iv 
5 .  
Corps in s upport . 
2 .  Hassler ,  p .  1 5 9 . 
3 .  Ibi d . , p .  159 . 
4 .  01'1'Tcal Records , Vol XI i  part II , p .  7 5 9 .  
5 .  Batt les � Leaders , Vo . II ,  pp . 375 , 376 , 377 . ( Fra nklin ) 
A little be fore n oon, Ja ckson 's for ce of J0., 000 appe are d a long 
6 .  
t he nor th e dg e  of the swamp w he_re Fr anklin ha d 18 , 000 to oppose hi.m , 
Jackson opene d with his ar tille r y  and a fa mo us ar tillery due l wa s 
under way.  Ai' ter g aining the smar te st advanta ge ,  the Re be l ar tille ry 
was ouste d by the Un ion gun s ;  the due l la ste d until sunse t, and 
once more Ja ckson had been kep t  fr on1 com pl e t  in g his mission. Ja ckson ' s 
cava lr y, . un der Col. Thoma s  T. Mum.for d ,  se t up a position on the south 
side of' the swan1 p on ly to be dr iven back w hen Ja ckson :!:'a ile d to 
7 ,  
supp or t it. The r e st o f  the da y the a ction her e  ( White Oa k Swanio 
Br idge ) wa s in the for m  of an ar tiller y  due l and a few pr obin g 
8 .  
atta cks by the Confe de rate s, w hich the Union e asily con ta ine d. 
At four O'clock Ja cks on had ma de a move towar d Bra clrn tt' s For d and 
Franld i n  se n t  two briga de s  to stop an y atte mpt to cr oss. Ja ckson, 
howe ve r ,  did not tr y to cross at the for d and t he two br iga de s  con -
G 
; . 
tin ue d on to j oin the Ba ttle of' G le ndale . I f  Ja ckson had succe e de d  
in crossin g White Oa k Swa mp, the re sult could have been disa strous 
10 ,  
to the Un ion for ce s a t  G lenda le . 
While Fr anklin wa s engaging Ja ckson a t  White Oa k Swamp Br idge , 
the re s t  of the Con fe de ra te a ttack colu mns were a ppr oa ching G lend a le � 
About noon the se Con fe de ra te s  e n coun te r e d  e le me n ts of the Union 's 
I I ,  III , and V Corp s one mile we st of the roa d  paral le l  to the Q.ua ker 
11 . 
Roa d, near G le ndale . The Con fe de ra te line of ba ttle ha d be en pass e d  
by A .  P . Hill a s  Longstree t, himse lf, wa s a bsen t. This line ha d Long-
stree t's d ivision in the front, w ith Br anch's brigade of A.  P .  Hill' s 
6 .  Hassler, p .  160 .  
7 ,  I bid. , p, 160 . 
8 ,  I'l3TCl:':" , p. 160 .  
9 .  Eckenrode & Conrad, 0 .  107 . 
10 , Ha ssler, p. 161 
1 1 ,  I bid. , p .  162 
12 . 
divi si on i n  s uppo rt .  In a short t ime t he r e  wa s a bri ef s k i rmi sh 
betwe en some Confederate cavalr y and Fe deral ski rmi s hers to t he front 
of the battle line . Thi s indi cat e d  that McC l el lan had troops in 
l J .  
posi t ion t o  pro te c t  hi s w e st flank . Long st reet arr ived short l y  
14.  
aft er t h i s  and w a s  p l ac e d  i n  c o111l!land of the fi e ld b y  General Le e .  
Lee sent back for wor d  of Magr uder ' s  progre ss , a s  he had heard not hiag 
15 . 
from Jackson and Hug e r  report e d  hi s progre ss wa s obstruc t ed .  Hug e r  
had the short e st rout e  to c over so Le e d idn ' t  f e e l  t h at he wo uld b e  
he ld up for l ong,  b ut sent word to Magrude r t o  r e st his troops duri ng 
16 . 
thi s d e l ay .  At two-thi rt y ,  Jack s o n ' s arti llery f ire wa s heard and 
mi s t ake n for the s ignal for the gene ra l  advanc e ,  whi c h  was to be given 
by Ruger . Longstreet and A .  P. Hi ll were re ady , but ther e was nothing 
17 . 
heard from the o t her c o l umns . 
Up t o  this point McClel lan was preparing his d efense.  Slocum 
was placed on the right , perpendi c ular t o  the Charle s City Road , t o  
oppose Huger . Slocum. ' s l eft j oi ned Kearney ' s  d ivis i o n  which was 
almo st para l l e l  to t he Charles C i t y  Road and perpend i cular to the Nev·: 
Market Road ,  wh ere th e d ivis ion ' s  left re st e d . S o uth of t he ro ad was 
McCall ' s  batt ered d i vis ion at a right angle to the ro ad and a Lnost 
18 . 
parall e l  to Q.uaker Roa d ,  vm ich was a b o ut a hal f mile t o  McCal l ' s rear . 
McClel lan boa rded Cofilillander John Rodge r ' s f lagship t o  di s c us s  naval 
arti lle ry s upport and defensiv e  p osi ti ons.  He a lso a rranged for c on-
tact to be made wi th t he s upp li e s  being bro ught up by ship from !u s 
12 . l!,reeman , p .  179 . 
l J .  Offi ci al Re c ords , Vol .  XI ,  part II , pp . 5 32 ,  759 . 
14. I b id . , Vo l .  XI, part II , p. 685 . 
15 . Ibid . , Vol .  XI , par t  II , p .  495 .  
16 . Freeman , PP • 180 , 181 . 
17 . Eckenrod e & Conr ad ,  p .  108 . 
18 . Has sle r ,  p .  16 ) .  
19 . 
o ld bas e at ¥tihi t e  Hous e .  
Up on h e ar ing Jac k s on ' s arti ll ery f i re , abo ut two - t hirty o ' cl o ck 
P .  M . , Le e rod e t o  j oi n  Long st r e e t .  Upon hi s a rriv al he fo und 
Pr e si de nt  Davis wit h Lo ng s t r e et ' s  uni t s .  The fo llowing co nve rsat ion 
t oo k  p l ac e : 
Davi s : "Why Gene ral , what ar e yo u d o i ng her e '?  Yo u are i n  
t oo dang e ro u s  a p o s i ti on 1· or t he C ommande r  o f  t he 
Army . "  
Lee : '"I ' .m t r ying t o  fi nd o ut s o me  t hing a b o ut t he move ­
.me n  t s  and p l ans o f  t ho s e  pe op l e . B ut yo u must 
exc use me , Mi s t e r  Pre s i d ent , fo r a sk i ng wh at yo u 
are d o ing her e and f or s ugg e s t ing t hat t hi s i s  no 
pr ope r  :pl ac e  for t he C o.mmande r a nd Chi e f  of' a l l  
o u r  armi e s . "'  
Davi s :  ''Oh , I am he re o n  t h e  s a me  mi s s i o n yo u ar e . "  
In a sho rt t ime Fe der a l  a rt i ll e ry fi r e  wa s f a ll ing near t he t wo 
.men and , a s  C omma nd er of t hat s e c t or of t he f i e l d ,  A .  P .  Hi ll o rde re d 
20 . 
them t o  l eave , wh ic h the y di d- - aft e r  t he s e c ond r e que s t .  
Ge nera l  S l o c um o f  the Uni on ha d mov e d  forvmrd t o  o pp o s e  Hug e r .  
Huger had 9 , 000 .men t o  S l o c um ' s 6 , oo o , b ut S l o c um ' s .me n  kept f e l li ng 
t re e s fa st e r  t h an the C onf e d e r at e s  c o u l d  c le a r  t he.m away . Ab out 
t hr e e  o ' c lo c k  Huge r op e ne d v:i t h  art i ll ery in a de sp e rat e .rnove t o  dri v e  
S lo c um.  o ff ,  only t o  have S loc WJl ' s a r t i l l e ry .mor e  t han .mat c h  hi s .  Huger 
2 1 . 
was st oppe d i n  his t r ack s .  
C o l on e l  Ro ss e r  of t he  ]'if t h Virgi ni a  Cavalry r e po rt e d  t he Uni on 
f or c e s tvere movi ng  wit h  ha s t e  t oward Malve rn Hi ll . Le e r o de o ut t o  
ch e ck on t he r e po rt an d f ound it t o  be t r ue . He o rde re d  Ho lme s  to 
19 . Offi c i al Re c ords , Vo l .  IlI , PP • 64-67 . 
2 0 .  I bid . , Vo l XI ,  part I I , p .  8 38 .. 
21 . :Fr eem an , pp . 199 , 20 0 .. 
bring up the re st of his  Divi si on and inf li ct what damage he c o ul d .  
Thi s was j us t  befo r e  t he incident invo lvi ng Pre sident Davi s and 
2 2 .  
hims elf . 
All final advanc e s  b egan at abo ut five ci ' cl o c k  p . m. Branch ' s  
brigade of Hi ll ' s  divi sion was on the Conf ederate r ight ; to hi s 
J 
left was Kempe r ' s  brigade of Longstreet ' s  W.. vi si on ;  to the le ft of' 
Kemper was Ande rs on ' s  brigade under Colonel Jenkin s ; and t o  the 
left o f  Jenkins , Wi lc ox ' s  bri gade was astri de Long Br idge Road . 
Feat her st one was on t he extreme left and Pryor was i n  support of 
Wi l.co·x . Pic kett ' s  brigade was b etwe e n  Jenkins and Wi lcox and sligh t ly 
t!ZJ(C: (/'l ,..,... 
to the rea r .  
2 3 .  
A. P .  Hi ll ' s  divis ion , t.tadG.:\, Branch ' s  b rigade , was i n  
reserve . 
Kemper ' s  brigade , whi c h  had ye t t o  s e e  action in the seven day s , 
fought vici ously,  pushing back the Fe deral skirmi sher s and , wi th out 
orders ,  cont inued t hro ugh a road , across an open f i e l d  and thro ugh 
24 . 
anoth er woo d .  Comi ng o ut i n  a s e co nd f i e ld they fo und that at o ne 
end was a log hou se  with a breastwork of rails a ro und it to the 
rear and to t he left of it there were two Union batterie s (Whi tlock 
Hous e ) . Kemp e r ' s men overran t he pos ition , capt uring six or eight 
guns , only t o  b e  fac e d  with heavy f ire from t he front and both 
flanlcs . The y had o ut di stanced  the rest of t he bri gade , but they 
held the i r  ground 
25 . 
st ubbo rnly.  Branch had f lound e red , ignorant 
01( 1" 
of the po sit ions of t h e  other uni t s  Cl"ft4 had advanc ed strongly .  
Jenkin s had pas s e d  very little ground and Wi lco ;< was d et aine d , unt i l  
5 : 40 , by co nf licting o rder s .  
Alabama i nfant ry , but pre s s ed 
2 2 . Freeman , pp . 183 , 184 . 
Vfue n  h e  d i d  advance , he dwindle d  his  
26 . 
on . 
2 3 .  I b i d .  1 p .  186 . 
24 . OI'I'i c ial Re c ords , Vol .  XI ,  part II , p .  265 . 
0 �  �� n � - n �  1 d � 
61. . 
When Wi l c ox' s .men e.m.erged int o an open fi eld ,  they came under 
the fire of infantry and two batteries  on either  side  of Long Bridge 
Road.  There was a wood s he ltering the Fe deral infantry,  and a clear 
street between th e Re bel for c e  and th e left battery.  The Eighth 
Alabama was stopped by a Union for c e  in t he wo ods ,  but th e Eleventh 
Alabama got wi thin one hundred yards of the enemy before :F'edera l 
27 . 
fir e forced them. bacl< .  They re newed the attack ,  getting t o  within 
fifty yards , but were re pre ssed and followed by the Union troops . 
In the batt le clash that followe d ,  the Uni on troops were re1)ulsed wi ti.1 
the rebels at their heels ,  overrunning the Federal g uns. The Federal 
gunner s  ret reated to the edge of t he woods , then tur ned and co unter-
attacked . In the bitter bayonet battle that f ollowed , Captain w. C .  
Y .  Parke r ,  C . S . A. , c ut down two Union officers befor e  falling with 
a muske t ball in hi s t hi gh and thr ee bayonet wo unds . The Confeder-
28 . 
at es were finally driven off . 
On t he ot her s ide of t he road  the Ninth and. Nineteenth Alabama 
had formed f or a charge , then seeing a Union regiment ;novi ng through 
the field ,  attacked it from t he flank . The Confede rat e drove th e Union 
troops back  upon t hei r  ovvn guns , were t en1porari ly repulsed, but the y  
rallie d  and t ook the guns.  The Union t roops converged wi th a counter-
attack and drove the Confederate o ff to  the woods on th e left , whe re 
29 . 
the E.leventh Alabama had been f or ced to seek cove r .  
Whe n Wi lcox was driven bac k ,  Pryor began receivi ng fir e  from the 
26 . Freeman , p .  1�6 , 187 . 
2 7 .  Ibi d . , p .  187 
28 . Official Rec ords , Vol .  XI ,  part II , pp . 237 , 238 ;  25 3-258 ; 391 ; 
403 ; 4 2 1 ;  776 , 777 .  
2 9 .  Freeman ,  p .  188 . 
fron t  a nd flank . He c al le d  t o  ]'e at herst on e f or a i d  a nd wa s  abl e t'"b 
30 . 
advanc e sl ow;ty a f t e r F e at he rst on e f orme d l eft . 
As s uns e t  ap proac he d ,  Kemp er wa s  s t i l l  h o l di ng  h i s s p e arh e ad 
i n  t he Uni on li ne s ,  c a u si ng h e avy l o s s e s am.o ng th e Bl ue - c lad e nemy 
and s i l e nc i ng a Uni on b at t e r y. Due t o  t he he avy Uni o n  f ir e , howe ve r ,  
h e  w a s  no t a bl e  to adv ance or wi t hdr aw ,  e it he r  o n e , and wa s t hre at -
31 . 
e n e d  wi th be i ng e nv e l op e d  by the ov erlapp i n g  Uni o n  l i n e s . 
Pi c ke tt wa s b ei ng  marc he d t o  t hi s  d ang er p o i nt , b ut Magrude r 
/ 
wa s· o ut of re ach s o  Le e had t o  th row A .  P .  Hi l l ' s  d i  vi s i o n  i nt o  t h e  
f r ay . Arc he r ,�re nt t o  th e s uppo rt o f  Kem.pe r a n d  Branch wit h Pi cke t t 
o n  hi s r.i ght . Fi e ld and P e nde r wer e t o  r e l i e v e  Wit-cox  wh i le J .  R .  
3 2 . 
And e r s on was he l d  i n  r e s e rv e . 
As t h e a dva nc e  b e g an , Branc h s p e e d e d  up and �� s  d rawn t o  t he 
c e nt er . Pi c ke t t  p as"'s e d  t hro ug h Ke:n p e r '  s l i ne , and r e a c he d  t he 
3 3 . 
Uni on b att e r ie s un der Di e de r i c k  and Kni e rem . As Bran c h  wa s dri ve n 
t o  t h e  c ent e r , hi s l eft wa s t br e at en e d , but i t  held de s pi te t he 
34 . 
h e avy Uni on f ir e .  
Fi e l d  d i vi de d  h i s  b r i gade o n  ei t h e r  s id e  o f  th e Long Bri dge 
Roa d , th e J!.,i ft y-Ei ght h  and S ixt i e t h  Vi rgi ni a ' on th e r ight , and th e 
F o rt i eth and Fo rt y-Ni nth Vi rg ini a on the l e ft ,  w:t t h  t he S e co nd Vi r-
gi ni a Batt a li o n .  Th e r i ght uni t s  c apt u r e d  t he Uni on g un s  onc e mo re 
( C o o p e r ' s  Bat te ry ,  whic h ha d b e e n  ta ken e ar l i e r by t he El e vent h 
3 5 . 
Alabania ) a nd pre s s e d  t o  the wo o ds on t he re ar of t h e  batt e ry .  The 
3 0 . 
31 . 
3 2 . 
3 3  
34 . 
3 5 . 
Off ic i al Re c o rds , Vo l .  
Freeman,  p .  18 8 .  
Ibi d . , pp . 187- 180 . 
I bi d  • , p • 19 O • 
. Off i ci al Re c or d s , 
Fr e eman , p .  190 . 
Vo l . 
XI '  p art II , pp . 786 ' 787 . 
XI ,  part I I , p .  8 8 3 . 
Fo rty-Ni nt h Vir g i ni a  d r o-ve the Uni on gunn er s o f  Rand o l ' s bat t e ry 
off and move d t o  t he wo od s whi l e  t h e  o t h er t .br e e re g iment s and the 
S e c ond Vi rg ini a bat t a l i on f ollowe d  t he Fe d e ra l  t ro op s  int o  t h e  woo ds  
36 . 
i n  st re ngth and e ngag e d the m  i n  a bayone t fi ght . 
One me mb e r  of th e S ixt i et h  Vi rgi ni a  en gag e d  f o ur Yanke e s  a t  one 
t im.e , ,,ki ll ing th re e  b e fo r e  fa l l i ng h ims e lf . Hi s br oth e r  t he n  ki l l e d  . 
3 7 . 
t he fl o urth Yank e e . The Fi f t y...,.Ei ghth an d S i J...'ti e t h  Vi rgi ni a o ut -
di s t anc e d  t h e  C o n f e d e r at e uni t s  o n  t h e  l eft o f  th e roa d .  Th e Forty -
S eve nth Vi rg i n i a  halt e d ne ar t he e dge o f  th e wo o ds t o  p rot e c t  t h e  
38 . 
f la nk of t he ot be rs , t urni ng o n e  of t h e  Uni on ' s  own g un s  on th em . 
Fie ld wa s pull ing the ri ght re gimen t f rom i t s  expo s t e d  po s i ti on , 
an d unknown t o  him , t he F e d e ra l s  we r e  c l o si ng fr om hi s ri g ht a nd r e ar .  
Pender s ave d Fi e l d  b y  f ir i ng f r om  vvi. t hin s eve nt y- f i v e  yard s ,  s c att e r -
38 . 
i ng th e Yanl{e e s ,  and 4:\e-c he r  j o i ned Pe nder on hi s righ t . i . R . _ Hi l l  
o :r d e re d Ande rs o n ' s re s e rve s i nt o  the fray and t h e Uni o n  t ro op s , 
t hi nki n g  the y wer e b e in g hi t b y  a la rg e number o f  fre s h  re s erve s ·, 
b r olrn . The i nfant ry a c ti o n  Vvu s  s o on ov e r , b ut th e art i l l e ry c o nti n u e d 
4 0 . 
unt i l  a b o ut 'ni ne o ' c l o c k  p . m .  Lo ng st r e et and Hi l l  •· s 2 0 , 0 00 me n 
ha d be e n  t l1I' o�n i nt o th e b itt er f i ght wh i l e  hav i ng  l it t l e  i n  the 
way of r e s e r v e s ,  and 5 0 , 000 or .more r eb e l s  s t o od i dl e  vi t hin t h e  
· 4 1 . 
so und of' bat t l e .  
· 36 . Fre e man , p .  1 90 .  
37 . Offi c i al Re c or d s , Vo l .  XI , part I I , p .  845 . 
3 8 . .ill..Sh· , Vo l . :a ,  pa rt I I , .  p .  84 5 • .  
39 , Fr eeman , p .  1 91 .  
40 . - Off i c i a l  Re cor d s , Vo l . XI ,  . pa rt II , pp . 49 3 , 8 38 , 8 3 9 ,  879 , 8 8 0 . 
41 . Fre e.ma n .  p .  1 9 2 . 
J a c ks on ha dn ' t c ov er e d  s even .mi l e s , St ua rt ha d b e en he ld up c o l -
l e c t i ng boo t y  an d p ri son er s , Hin ge r  had b e e n  st opp e d  b y  S l o c Ufil  and 
Mag r ud e r  ha d fai l e d t o  r e ach Ho lm.e s , who wa s  paralyz e d  by Uni on'S art i l-
42 . 
le ry. 
Jac ks on h ad  b e en s t oppe d by t he d e s t ro y e d  bri dge s , uni on art i l l ery , 
and sharp shoot er s ,  and had mi s se d  a c hanc e t o  c ro s s  at Fi she r ' s For d 
4 3 . 
a b o ut t br e e  mi le s from h i s  po s iti on . 
Whi l e . ·th e  Un i on vm s chec ki ng L e e ' s purs u i t  at Gl en d ale a nd Whi t e  
O.ak Bri dg e , Ho lme s and We st had .mo ve d  d own t he Riv e r  Roa d ,  i n  an 
e ff o rt to s e i z e  Malve rn Hi l l  and T urke y Bridg e .  McC le l lan sp o t t e d  
t hi s  advance fr om. t he "Ga l e n s e o a nd Port e r  s o on appe are d up on t he 
C on f' e d e rat e s ,  a i de d  b y  th e  one h undre d - p o und she ll s fir e d  fr om t h e  
11Ga le nse u .  S e vent y- s i x  Re b e l  g un s  wer e de s t ro ye d , two we r e  c apt ur e ci , 
44 . 
and t he f inal s t age o f  Lee ' s  fo ur - prong e d  at tac k had f ai l e d . 
At mi dn i gh t  on J une 30 , t he Uni on ma in b od y  wa s  saf e at Haxall ' s ,  
45 . 
t hank s t o  the hard fig ht i ng of t h ei1� r e ar g ra. :r d .  
G e ne ra l McCall ; U . S . A. , wa s c apt ur e d  b y  t h e  Forty-Seventh Virginia , 
and the He b e l s  h a d  capt ur ed e :ig ht  g un s , b ut t h ei r }Jlan t o  c ut t h e  
46 . 
Uni on re tre at had fa i le d .  
42 . Off i ci al Re c or ds , Vo l .  YJ ;  p art II , pp . 2 28 , 5 3 2 , 906 
43 . Ii're e.rn.an , p .  196 . 
44 . Has s l er , p .  , 16 5 . 
45 . Ibi d . , p .  16 5 
L�6 . :B're ema n , _pp . 191 , 192 . 
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CHAPTER VI 
At t wo o ' c l o c k  a . lll . t h e  lllorning of J u l y  1 ,  Magr ude r ' s t r o o p s  
a r r i v e d  o n  t h e  bat t l e f i e ld o f  Gle nd al e . The y had b e e n  o n  t h e  mov e 
f o r  e i g ht e en c ont i n u o u s  h o ur s  w it ho ut f o o d , but re li eve d  the d i  vi s i o n s  
2 .  
o f  Long s t re e t  and A .  H .  Hi l l  imme di at e l y .  When h i s t r o ops 
mov e d  i nt o  p o s i t io n ,  t he y  f ound t hat the Fe de ral t ro o p s  we re s t i l l  
tp, t h e ir f r o nt . One ho ur la t e r  C onf e d e r at e  ski rmi s he r s  f o und t hat 
3 .  
the s e  t r oo p s  h ad  wi thd rawn . 
Dur i ng t h e  pre c e e ding night , Mc C le ll an ; Port e r , Maj o r  Ge neral 
Andrew A. Hamphre ys a nd G e n era l Barnar d s e le c t e d the s i t e s  fo r t h e i r  
d e f e n s i v e  p o s it i o ns , a nd b e gan p l a c i ng t he unit s f or t he c omi ng 
4 .  
b at t l e . On c e  t he t r oo ps we r e  i n  p o s i t i on , McC le l l an b o a rd e d  t he 
R og e r ' s  f lag s hi p , l e f t  Haxa l l , and le f t  t o  s e l e c t  t he f i na l l o c a -
5 .  
t i o n  fo r t he Army of the I) o t om.a c an d it s s up�J l i e s .  
Nfa lv e r n  Hi l l  wa s t he t yp e  o f  l) O S i  t i o n  Mc C l e llan lov e d  t o  defe nd . 
On e i th e r  s i de o f  t he hi ll t h er e we r e  two f ront i e r  home s ; i n  f ro nt , 
b e  l ow it s he ig.ht s , we re c l ea r , o p e n  fi e ld s , b e h ind whi c h  t he r e  wa s 
a svvamp y f o r e s t . 'rh i s  me a n t  t l1a t any att a c k i n g  army would no t have 
6 .  
v e ry much r o om t o  f'ofin i t s l in e s .  Por t e r ' s  C o r�p s  a n d  s i x t y  g uns 
vrn re t o  t he l e f t  s i d e  of t he h i l l  nea r t h e  Jame s 1::Zi ve r .  To h i s 
2 .  O f f i c i a l  Re c o r d s ,  Vo l .  XI , part  I I , p .  686 .  
3 .  Fre eman , p .  2 0 0 .  
4 .  Ha s s l er ,  p .  16 6 .  
5 .  Bat t l e s  a n d  Leade r s , Vo l . II , p .  4 1L� .  ( Port e r ) 
6 .  Fr e eman , pp . 2 02 ,  203 . 
right , re adi ng f r om. l e ft t o  right , were  the di v i si ons of c o uch , 
I\:e arney , Hoo ke r , S e dgewi c k ,  Ri c ha rd s o n , W .  F .  S.m.ith , S l o c um. ,  and 
7 .  
John Pe e k . Warren wa s  o n  t he l eft wit h 800 m.e n ,  prot e c ti ng the 
River Ro ad .  . In, hi s s u ppo rt wa s t he Eleve nth U. S .  Infa nt r y  under 
Major Floyd Jon e s ;  Mart in ' s  batt e ry o f  twe lve po unde rs ,  and Lt . Frank 
He s s ' d e tacl1m.e nt fr om t he Thi rd Pe nn s ylvani a c avalry . On the we st 
/ 
e nd of. t he- hi ll , thirt y- s ix g uns had f ull swe ep of t he val ley over 
Wa rr en ' s po si ti on . The s e  wer e  batt e ri e s o f  th e  Fi ft h ,  Thi rd , and 
, S e e oncl. U. S .  Art ill ery B at t a l i on s , and t hos e of the Fir s t  New York 
8 .  
art i ll e ry an d  Fi r st C o nn e c t i c ut a rt i l le r y .  Mo st of the Fe de ral 
_ ,  
arti ll e ry wa s in a lan e one fo ur th of a m.i l e  wi de ; from. Crew Ho use 
' 
on th e upp e r  s i d e  of t he r i dge , e a s t  t o  We st Ho u s e ; and a c ro s s  
· t he Wi ll i s Church Ro ad . B e yond We st Ho us e t h ere wa s a noth e r  b at te ry 
9 ,  
prot e c ti on- -t he Uni on flank ., The hi l l  i t s e lf vva s  one half m.i le 
a c ro s s . and am.pi t he atre in s hape ; being l� .mi le s long an d  3/4 of a 
.m.i·le wi de ; i t  r o s e  ab o ut fi fty f e et ab ove ·  t he op.en fi e l d s  t o  i t s  
1 0 . 
f ront . The Uni on h ad 10 0 arti ller y g un s  in r e s e rve wi t h  th e la rge 
g un s  under C o l .  Hunt t o  t he rear o f  t h e d e f e ns e  l in e .  Al l t he appro.ac he s 
t o  the hi ll wer e  c ov e re d  by the Uni on f o rc e s  w i th t he Un i o n  g unb o at t o  
1 1 . 
t-he i r  r e a r  and flanks . 
· 
De s pi t e  t he f ac t  tha t the Uni o n  t roops had 
b e e n i n  re tre at f or almo st a ;.re e k ,  the .m.orale of th e t r o op s  was high , 
1 2 . 
and ail t he Fe der al reg iment s were pre s e nt f or t he c o.mi ng· batt l e . 
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
io . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
Hassler; pp . 166 ,  1b7 . 
Bat tl e s  � L e ader s ,  Vo l .  II , p .  409 . 
Fre e.m.an , p .  204 . 
Ha s s le r , pp . 16 5 ; 166 . 
C att on : Mr . Lin co ln ' s  Ar.my , p .  3 6 2 .  
Ha s s l er ,  P. 165 .  
( Porter ) 
Le e c a ll e d  h i s  c ommande r s  tog et h e r  to p l an t h e  a t t ack fo r t he 
day . Long s t r e e t  wa s very o pt imi st i c , but A .  I L  Hi ll a dvi s e d  aga i ns t  , 
1 3 .  
at t ac k i n g  Ma lve rn Hi l l .  Under th e orde rs f o r  t he day ,  Jack s on 
wa s t o  tak e  up t he pur s ui t  down Wi ll i s Ch ur c h  Road ; Mag r ud e r  wa s t o  
t ake Q,uak er Road o n  Jac ks on ' s  ri ght ; Huge r ' s di vl si on wa s  di vi de d ;  
Mahone and Rans om. '  s two bri gade s w e r e  t o  follow Jac k s on down t he 
Wi ll i sh Church Road ; whi l e  k:ing s t re e t  and A .  P .  Hi ll ' s  divi s i on 
f or me d .the r e s erve . ,Armi s t ead a n d  Wr ight ' s  brigade s we r e  t o  advanc e 
t hrough the woo d s and t ake t he C har l e s Cit y Ro ad t o  Long Bri dge Roa d , . ,  
and f r o.m  th e r e  t o  Ivla lve rn Hi ll . Th i s  me ant tha t Jack s on ' s  d ivi s i o n ,  
t wo br igade s o f  Huger ' s di vi si on , and Magr ude r ' s d ivis i on would end 
up on the s ame r oa d  ( Wi ll i s  Church , )  b ut th e r e  wa s no alt e rnati ve 
as t h i s  \11.i'8.s t he only approach t o  the Fe deral f lank an d re ar a s  far 
14 . 
a s  Le e knew . Ac t u ally � Le e and Magrud e r  had a .m.i x up . Lee had 
a c t ually i nt ende d fo r Mc<grude r t o  take t he Wi l li s  Chur c h  Road , b ut 
it. gave Magruder the wro ng name t hi nki ng t hat the r ca  d t h e  .mai n forc e 
15 . 
was usi ng wa s Quaker Road . 
Up on re a c hi ng t h e  po si ti ons in fro nt of Ma lve rn :H.i l l , Le e di s ­
pla ye d  hi s t roo p s  a s  w e l l  a s  the woo ds wo uld p e rmi t . From l e ft t o  
ri ght , he had VJhi ti ng ' s d i vi si on and o ne brigade o f  Ewe l l ' s  d ivi s i on , 
A .  FI .  Hi l l , two br igade s of Rug e r ' s  d i vi si on ,  Magrud e r ' s di v i s i on ;  
wit h a bat t ery from. We nde r ' s  bri gade , and the re,st of Evve l l ' s  div i -
si on for hi s r e s e rve . Long s"t; r ee t  and A. P .  Hi ll forll18 d th e .ma i n  
1 3  • Fre em.an , p .  2 0 0 . 
14 . Ibid . ,  pp . 201 , 20 2 .  
1 5  . Ibi d .  , p .  20 5 " 
16 . 
r e s e rve on the ri ght ; Jac kson ·1Na s in c o.mm.and o n  the le ft . l!'rom 
t en o t c lock a • .m.. unt i l  n oo n ,  C o nfe dera t e  ski rmi s he r s  were f e el i ng 
17 •
.
 
along t h e  li ne ,  t e st i ng  i t s s t r engt h .  
Ja c ks on vd she d t o  hi t t h e  Un i o n  Fla nk , whi l e  Lo ng s t r e et sai d h e  
c o u ld p la c e  s i xt y  g ui1 s  to h i t  t h e  Uni on art i l l e ry po s i t i ons fr o.m 
whe r e  fviagrq.d e r ' s .me n wer e  ,fo r.me d . Thi s  wa s  i.mp o s s i bl e d ue t o  t h e  
c rampe d quar t e r s  o n  t h e  mar s hy gr ound , b ut Le e gave him p e rmi s si on .  
'When t h e  C o nf e derat e  g wi s  o pene d f i re and d emo r a li z e d t he Uni on 
t roop s , a l l  of t he C on f e de rat e inf ant ry uni t s  we re t o  make a s imul = 
t ane o us at t ack ., Be f o re t hi s c o ul d  t ake pla c e ,  d e t e r.mi ne d cannon 
arti l l e ry f i re op e n e d  all a long t he fr o nt ., Unde r  t h i s  f ir e , Arini s -
1 8 . 
t e ad and Wri ght .made t hei r  way t o  the ri ght o f  Wi ll i s  Chur c h  Ro ad 
1 9 0 
a n d ,  under t h e  nor th s i de o f  t h e  hi J. l ,  e ng ag e d  Uni o n  ski rmi sher s .  
H i s  po s iti o n  wa s c l o s e  t o  the kno l l  whe n Long st r e et had d e c i de d  t o  
s et up hi s a rt i l l e ry ,  and h e  de c i de d  t o  hol d  hi s t ro o p s  there unt i l  
Mag rudar arr i ve d . L e e  inf or.me d Armi s t e ad t o  att ac k  i f  th.e Uni o n  sho L1ld 
show s i gns of bre aking under . t he C onf e de rat e a rt i l le ry f ir e , and t hi s  
was. t o  b e  t h e  s i gna l f or an a ll - o ut att ac k .  'l'hi s  o rde r wa s s e nt  at 
abo ut l : J O a . m . t o  all st aff off i c e r s  and c o ur i ers ; b ut t h e r e  
wa s no way o f  t e ll ing how l ong i t  wo ul d t ake f o r  i t  t o  be del i ve re d  
20 . 
t o  all the unit s . 
The Conf e derat e s  b eg an  t he art ille ry f ire fr o.m the knol l  behi n d  
Ar.mi. s t e ad , and it wa s t aken up all a l o ng t he l i n e . The Uni on g uns 
16 . Ha s sler , P •  167 . 
17 . Bat tle s � Le ade r s , P •  415 . ( Port e r )  
18 . Ecken r od e  & Conrad , p .  ll J ,.  
1 9 �  Fre eman, pp . 206 , 207 . 
2.0 . .!_ill. '  pp . 207 ' 208 . 
answe re d vn t h  a roar and in a s ho rt t ime , word f i lt e r e d  bac k that 
the re b e l  g un s  wer e  b e i ng s i le n c e d  in t he une qua l  d u e l . Vf.a.en t h e  
fi ring s t art e d ,  t here we r e  o n l y  thr e e  re be l bat teri e s  in po s i ti on 
on t h e  knoll and only two i n  lJ O s i  ti on on t he C o nf e d e rat e l e f t . The 
recs e rve art i ll ery rema i ne d  i nac t i ve and ' as a r e s ult ' only t we nty g uns 
2 1 . 
f ir e d  o n  t he Uni on , i n s t e ad o f  t he expe ct e d  o n e  hundre d .  Th i s  
f i r st _pha s e  was o ver b y  tvvo -thi r t y  o ' c lo ck , le aving the Uni o n  f o rce s 
uns hake n in t hei r p o s i ti ons , and t he i r  i nf an try uneng ag e d . Magrude r 
was sti ll o n  hi s mar c h  on t he wr ong r oa d  and th er e was c o nf usi o n  a s  
2 2 . 
t o  who was t o  c omm.and the Confe derat e ri ght unt i l  he arrived . 
Le e de c i de d  t o  shi ft t he att a c k  t o  t h e  l e ft q.nd hi t th e Uni on f lank ; 
23 . 
unfort uneat e ly he mi s s e d  a g o od sp ot 'f or it . The only wa y Le e 
. 
c ould make t hi s  s hi f t  wa s t o  u s e  t he  d i v i si ons of Long s t r e et and 
A .  P .  Hi l l ,  hi s re s e rv e s ; so L o ng s t r e et was ordere d t o  make t h e  
move to t h e  l eft . At the s ame t ime a r e J)O rt c ame in o f  Uni on wagon­
t rains pull ing b ac k ;  rat her t han al low t he Union t o  c ompl e t e i t s  
24 . 
-vvi t hd rawal , Le e orde r e d  Armi s t e ad t o  att ac k. Th i s  c au s e d  Long s =  
t re et t o  und er s t and t hat Le e had. ch anged hi s .mi nd and he halt e d  hi s 
2 5 . 
mo ve to t he le ft . Ar.mi s t e ad had not r e c e i ve d  t he a rt i l le ry s uppoi·t. 
he wa nte d ,  but he r ep ul se d  t he Uni on ski rmi she r s  an d th rew t h ree 
reg imen t s  forward ab cu t  thr e e  o ' c l o c k .  Th e s e  un i t s gai ne d a l i t tl e  
26 . 
gro und and h e ld on st ubb ornly . Magrude r ar rived a bou t fo ur o ' c l o ck .. 
He h ad r e c e i ved t be  o rd e r  i s s ue d  at one-t hirty o ' cl o c k ;  b ut not t he 
o t h e r  o ne an d ,  s ince the t i.me wa s  no t on th e o rde r ; he as s ume d  i t  t o  
21 . li.,re e .man , · p.p . 208 , 209 . 
22 . I b i d . , p .  20 9 .  
23 . I b i d . , p .  2 10 .  
24 . Off' i c i al Re c ords , Vo l .  XI ,  part II , pp . 677 , 678 . 
2 5 . Fra eman ; p .  2 1 0 . 
26 .  I b i d . , pp . 2 1 1 ,  2 1 2 .  
-
27 (J 
b e  th e c urr e nt p la n  of att ac k . Magrud e r  wa s pr c;; p ari ng t o  c arry 
o ut the order und er int e n s e  ai�t ill e ry f i re when t he lat t e r  one arr i ve d ; 
t h us Ma gruder wa s c o nf us e d and d e c id e d  t o a s s ault t h e  fro nt oi' t h e  
Uni on p o s iti ons on C r e w ' s Hi ll , at t he s ame ti2e movi ng tro ops d own t he 
2 8 . 
e dg e  of a whe at f i e l d  t o  hit t he f lank $ To a c comp l i s h  thi s move 
he had Armi s t e ad ' s ,  ·wri ght ' s  and :Maho ne ' s  br i gade s of Huge r ' s  d i.vi ­'"' 
s i on ; and G .  T .  Ande rs on ' s ,  S e.ru.me s ' and Barkd ale ' s of h i s  own d i  v i s i on�-
29 . 
t he c om b i ne d  for c e  n umb e r e d  ab o ut 1 5 , 00 0  me n .  
VVri ght ' s  b r i gade h ad b e e n  s ld rmi s hing i n  th e sp asmo d i c  at tack s :for 
s evera l h o ur s  and wa s  s omewhat s c at t e red . On t he ot he r  hand Ma hone ' s 
JO • 
Vir gi ni an s  we r e  f re sh . At fo ur- f if t e en o ' c l o c k ,  Wri ght mov e d  . 
hi s _p o si t i on f orward t o  the li ne of hi s ski rmis he r s , and at f o ur- f or t y-
f i ve o ' cl o ck ,  he wa s  order e d t o  adva nc e . As s o on a s  h e  s t art e d  hi s 
adva n c e ,  th e Uni on f i re do uble d a nd hi s rank s  we re t orn , a nd t h o s e  
of Mahon e ' s wer e t hi nned b e f ore t hey c o uld e ngage t he :F'e deral inf an, ... 
Jl . 
t ry ,  whi c h  hadn ' t  fi r e d . At the s i gh t  o f  Wrig ht ' s  advanc e , Armi s -
t e ad ' s t roop s  j oi ne d  i n  only t o  re c ei ve h eavy l o s s e s . The uni on 
t ro o p s  t hrea t e n e d  to f l ank Franlc Ar.mi st e a d ' s  .m e n  so Wri ght c hang e d  hi s 
3 2 . 
f r ont t o  st op the t hre at .  Just as i t  a pp e ared that thi s at t acl{; wo uld 
b� broke n ,  A .  P. Ri ll adva nc e d  f r om  th e Re b e l  c e nt e r ,  an d  Wri g ht and 
Maho;rie inc rea s e d  t hei r at t empt s ,  g e tt i ng w ithi n 75 yards of t h e  e nemy 
whe n t h e y  t o ok c over , i n  a hollow .  A .  H .  Hi ll had t o  advan ce up an 
inc li ne 7 00-800  yards l ong , and wa s r e c e i vi ng  t he f ull f or c e  o f  the 
27 . Fre eman , p .  212 . 
28 . I b id . ,  P •  2 1 2 .  
29 . Off'i  c ia l  R e  cor ds , Vo l .  iG: ,  part II , p .  66 9 .  
J O .  Fr e eman , p .  2 1 3 . 
Jl . I b id . , P •  213 • 
.3 2 • 1 b i<i. ' p • 21 .3 0 
7'/.... 
' 
3 3 . 
Uni on s h el l s and c ani s t e r . The r e  �a s  l it t le that c ou l d  be done t o  
the Uni on arti l le r y  a s  lVIag r ud e r '  s ar t i ll e ry , t ho ugh c lo s e  by , co uld 
34 . 
no t b e  bro ught int o  p o s iti on . Garl an d ' s b r i gade a dva n c e d  a b o ut 
400 yard s ,  t he n  had t o  s t o p  fo r r e i nf o rc em e nt s . C o l on e l  Jam.e s B .  
Gordo n  l e d  Rho de ' s br igade t o  viii thi n 2 0 0  yar d s  o f  t he Uni on t r o op s , 
t he n  he , t oo , wa s for c e d  t o  halt . G .  B .  Ande r so n  c o uld not r e ach 
t he Uni on bat t e r i es hi t t ing hi s t ro o p s  an d C o lp u i t  wa s bro ug ht t o  a 
3 5 . 
s t andst i l l , a l s o , as ha d .Ri p l ey .  I f  Ma gr ude r ' s  t ro o p s  c o uld j oi n  
t he� att a c k  at on c e , t he re wa s  a c hanc e , b ut hi s t ro op s  wer e wo rn o ut 
f rom the mar c h  and had l o st a l ot of .me n by dro p o ut s . C o b b ' s  bri -
36 .  
gade was t he str onge s t  and it only had 1 , 5 0 0  me n out of i t s 2 , 7 0 0 . 
Magr u der t ho u ght he wa s i n  d anger and c all e d  o n  Lo ngst r e e t  f or 
re i nfo r c eme nt s .  A.  P .  Hi ll .mo ve d t o  p r ot e c t  h i s ri ght f lank ,, and 
t he l i n e  of batt l e  wa s d r if t i ng  to th e  l eft . C o nf u.s i on s e e.me d t o  be 
37 . 
on hand eye r ywh e re , a s  Lee orde re d 1\·lagruder t o  pre s s  t o  th e ri g ht . 
A .  H .  Hi ll c a ll e d  for r e i nfo r c ement s fr om. Jack s on , who wa s  d o i ng 
not hi ng ex,c e p t  s t andi ng i n  s upp o rt of t he a rt i l l e ry on t h e left . 
Wh it n e y  appare nt ly t ho ught t he att ac k  wa s t o  be s ol e ly on the ri ght , 
38 . 
whi le Jac ks on f el t  t he Uni o n  p o sit ion s to hi s f ron t we r e  i npregnab le . 
Howe ve r ,  J a c k s on d id o rd e r  Ewel l ' s  d iv is i on an d hi s own t o  mo ve f or wa rd ., 
Vfilli s .Church Ro ad wa s almo st im.pas s i b l e  and i t  wa s the o nly r oad . 
As Gene ral Early t r i e d to get h i s  b r ig ade t o  th e a i d o f  A. H .  Hi ll , 
34 . Off i c i al Re cor d s , Vol ,, XI ,  part II , pp . 643 , 6 28 . 
3 5 .  I bi d . , Vo l JCT ,  part I I , pp . 6 28 and 6 3 5 . 
36 . I b id . ; Vo l :a , . part II ,  pp . 74s ... 7 5 0 .  
3 7 ..  :B,reem.an , pp . 215 , 216 . 
38 . Offi c i a l  He c ords , Vo L XI ,  p art II , pp . 5 88 , 5 5 6 , 5 6 7 , 5 87 , 5 97 - 98 
he ran i nt o s o  many skulke r s  and d i sorgani z e d  t r o op s  t hat he l o s t  
· 3 9 .  
t o uch wi th hi s own men . Toome ' s  b ri gade c am.e to the s up p o rt of 
D .  H. Hi ll ; '' broke in bl o o d  and flowe d ba c k  to t he w oo d s " aft er 
40 . 
s ea rch in g t he c re st o f  t he hi ll . Garland and Go rdon we re fin-
i sh e d  and f i re from c on fu s e d  C on fe de rat e s  t o  t h e  r e_ar was ,add ing t o  
41 . 
the . lo s s e s o f  Rip l ey an d Ke r shaw .  
Wind er a nd Trumb le were pre s s ing t hro ugh t h e  v.o o d s  whi le Ewe ll 
was i n  a verit able j ungle ; ther e wa s n o  hope of the i r  r e aching t he 
42 .. 
fight b e fo r e nig ht fal l . On t he r ig ht , Magru de r ' s we ary t r o o p s  
w e r e  c o.mi ng  i nt o  act ion , b u t  th e Uni on art i l le ry fi r e  s o o n  wr e c ked 
and demora li z e d  t hem . S enn.e ' s  brigade wa s r e c e i vi ng so mu ch f i re , 
4 3 . 
from fri endly troop s o n  hi s f lank ; th at he had t o  wit hdraw . 
Ran s om ' s br i gade , l at e  in st art i ng , got c l o s e  eno ugh t o  ai d Wri ght 
and Mahone . He h it w e s t  of C rew ' s Hous e , g ot 'Wi thi n 20 yar d s  of th e  
Fe der al po s it i ons ; t h e n  had t o  fa ll b ac k  t o  hi s or ig inal p o si t i on du e 
t o  t h e  murde r o u s  fi re , Wri ght and Mahone c ould n ot f or c e the 
Uni on t r o o p s  from the i r d ug -i n  pos it i on s .  Ar.m.i st ea d , wit h Vir i ght and 
Maho ne ; t r i ed thr e e  more a s sault s j  drove o n e  Union b at t e ry t o  p ul l  
ba ck', an d c a us e d Gr iffin ' s  Fe deral b r i gade t o  g i ve g r o und . With 
mo r e  he l p  fr om Magru d e r ,  t he y  may h ave br oken t hro ugh ,  a s  Griff in ' s 
·- · 
bri gade ha d be e n  taki n g  t he brunt of the Conf e d e rat e at t a c k a l l  day , 
. 44 . 
b ut i t  wa s t o o  l at e .  
As .da rkn e s s  s e tt l e d ,  Hi ll an d Magr ud e r  p u l le d b ac k ; only Wri g ht ' $ 
39 . 
40 . 
41 . 
42 .  
43 . 
44 . 
Off i c ia l  
Fr·e eman , 
O f1� i ci al 
Fre eman, 
O f f i c i al 
Fre .eman , 
Re c or ds , Vol . 
p .  216 . 
.Re c o rd s , Vol . 
.PP . 216 ; 2 17 .  
Re c or d s ; Vo l .  
p .  21 7 .  
xr ,  p a rt  I I  ; ,. ' pp . 612 ' 6 1 3  • .  
XI , part II , p • 2 16 . 
XI , part I I , P •  7 2 4 .  
an d Maho ne ' s b ri g ade s c lung t o  t h e ir a dva nc e d  p o s it i o n . rrhe i nfa n­
t ry att a c k s  we r e  f i ni s h ed a nd t he a rt i l le ry c e a s e d  betvve en ni ne an d 
t en o ' c loc k p • .m .  At t h e h e i ght o f  t he batt le ; Gri f f in h ad c a l l e d  
f o r  ai d a n d  S um.m.er se nt the B r i g ad e s o f  Me agh er a nd Hi e nt z e l.man s ent 
45 . 
S i c kl e s ,  an d  b ot h  of t hem re ac he d Gri ff i n  at t he cruc ia l p oi nt . 
J u s t  b e f o re S i ckl e s  and ·Meagh e r '  s br igade s a dv anc ed , the Uni on 
g unb oat s op e n e d  f i r e . Th e y  e i t h e r  llli s t o ok t he Uni on b at t e ri e s at 
Malv e r n  Ho us e  as r e be l s , or c ould no t fi re far eno ug h , What eve r  t he 
c a us e , the i r  ro und l an de d  by Tyll r '  s batt ery ,  ki l ling and wo undL:.g 
46 . 
s o.me o f  h i s m en .  I t  vm s  s o o n  s t o .:. pe d and f urt he r  damag e  was pr eve nt e d . 
I t  wa s  Kus s e r o u s ' 3 2- p o und s i ege  g uns and t ho se o f  Fye r s ' ,  and t he 
47 . 
Re be l s  .mi s t o o k  f o r  f i r e  from the g unb oat s .  Po rt e r ,  who move d 
w it h Me aghe r , ha s t hi s  t o  say a·b o ut  the heavy l o s s e s , in bat t l e s  a nd 
l e ade r s : nrt was s o.me t lu ng f e arf ul and sad t o  c o nt empla t e ; five st e ps 
c o ul d  no t b e  taken wi t ho ut t ramp l i ng o n  t he b o d y  of a d e ad o r  w o unde d 
s o ldi er , or wi t ho ut h ea ri ng a p i t e o us cry , begg i ng o ur pa rty t o  be 
car e f u l . In s ome p la c e s  t h e  b odi e s  we r e  in c o nt i nuo u s  l i n e s  and 
i n  he ap s". I n  Me xi co I had s e e n  f i e l ds o f  b at t le o n  whi c h  armi e s  o f  
o u r s  ha d b e e n  v i ct o ri o u s , and had l i st ene d t o  pi t if ul appe al s ; bu� 
the p l e ad e r s  wer e no t o f  m.y c o unt rymen t he n ,  and d i d  no t , as now , 
4 8 . 
c a us e me t o  dep l o r e  t he effe ct s o f  frat ri c i dal war . " 
45 . 
46 . 
47 . ,  
48 . 
Duri ng t h e  n i g h t  1,foCle l lan wi t hdrew t o  a saf e r  po s it i o n  a t  Sarri ... 
Batt le s a.n d .Lea der s ,  p .  42 1. 
Ibid . ,  p74°22 . · '  (Porter ) , · 
Ibi d . ,  p .  422 ( Po rter ) 
IBI'd. , p .  4 2 3 . ( p o rt e r } 
{ Port e r) 
"ff. 7S 
s o n ' s Landi ng ,  wher e h e  wo uld be und e r the c ov e r  of h i s  gu nbo at s .  
The r e a r  g u ard vva s  l e ft un der C o l . Ave re l l of th e Thirty-Se co nd Pe nn s yl =  
v ani a  C avalry , who arr ang e d  hi s c av alry t o  r e pr e s e nt ho r s e  art i l le r y ;  
. 49 . 
t he r us e worlrn d .  I t  wa s rai ni ng on J uly 2 an d Le e wa s  c ons i a_ e ri ng 
a r e n ewal of t h e a t t ac k . Re p or t s came i n  a b out t he Uni on w it hdrawo. l , 
but t h e  C o nf e derat e t i-·oops w e r e  t o o  w or n  o ut t o  c on t i nue t he pursuit . 
St uart r e por t e d  h o ld i ns: the h igh ground a b ove the ]fe de ra l p os i ti on , 
but he f o oli s hly f i re d  hi s o n e  c annon and vm s  dri ve n o ff , and t he 
Unfon fo rc e s  t o ol( p o s s e s s i on o f  t he hi 11 ( J uly 3 ,  Eve l ing t on Height s .  ) 
Wh e n  Le e a rr i ve d  an d e xami ne d the Uni on p o s i ti o n ,  he de c i de d t hat 
f urther att a ck wa s  hop e le s s , an d on J" uly 9 , he wi thdrew t m01ard 
5 1 . 
Ri chm.o n d .  
Mc C l e ll an se t t l e d  down t o  a l on g  S tJ.JGin.e r of ar gu i ng f o r  re i nf or c e ···· 
Thro ugho ut t h e  c ampa i gn t he Re be l s  ha d a t t a c ked McCl e l l an whe r e  
h e  c ho se t h e bat t l e fi e l d ; add t hi s  to p o o r  map s , the c o nd i t i o n  o f  
t he i r  e qu i p£11e nt , a nd t he o ve rv;he lmi n g  ]'e de ral a rt i ll e ry and it i s  a. 
wond e r  t h at t he y  came a s  c lo s e  t o  s u c c e e d i ng a s  t h e y  ha d .  D .  H .  Hi ll 
e xp1"e s s e s  thi s i dea i n  Bat t l e s  � Le a d e r s , and add s  that , q' The 
C o nf e d e r at e  i nf an t ry and lPe d e ral a rt, i l le r y ,  si de by s i de o n  t h� s run e  
5 3 . 
f i e l d ;  ne e d  f e ar no f o e  o n  earth . n 
40 'j • 
5 0 . 
5 1 . 
5 2 . 
5 3 . 
Mc C le ll an had b e e n  rms he d a way f r om Ri chfilond a nd Le e had s u c c e eded 
Bat t le s  and Leader s , p .  4 22 . 
Fre em an , P. 22 8 .  
' '  . d · ,,.,2 9 ? J O � o i . , pp . � , � • 
M c C l el l an , pp . 4 5 0 ; 45 1 .  
Bat t le s an d  Lea d e r s ,  p .  :3 93 . 
(l'orte r )  
( D .  H .  Hi ll ) 
5 0 . 
11. 
i n  s avi ng hi s capit o l . "'The so l d i er who had f o ught wi th all t he ' ·  
o d d s  ag ai nst him. , had t ak e n  hai r-rai st ng ri sks , and 1.Von ; the s o ldi e r  
wh o ha d a l l  of t h e  advant ag e s  had r e f us ed t o  r is k  anyth ing and lo st ; 
and now t he la s t  ch an c e that thi s '"lino us war c o ul d  b e  r e l at i v e ly 
54 . 
s h o r t  wa s g o ne fo rev e r .  0 
The Uni o n .A:rmy , i n  t he S e ve n  Days , h ad los t 5 1  g uns ; 27 , 0 0 0  s t and s 
of s.ma l l  arms . 'rhe .A:rmy o f  t he Po t o.ma c had lo s t  1 ,  7 34 ki l le d ,  
8 , 08 2  wo un de d and 6 , 05 3 capt ur e d  and .m.i s s i r:g , f or a t ot al c a s ualt y 
5 5 . 
li st o f  15 , 849 . 
The Al"m.y of Nort he rn Vir g i ni a  los t 3 , 2 86  ki l l e d , 1 5 , 90 9  wo und e d ,  
5 6 . 
an d 44 0 .mi s si ng o r  c apt ur e d , f or a t ot al c a s ual t y  li st o f 20 , 1 35 . 
54 . Catt on , Th i s  Ha ll owe d  Gro und , p .  144 . 
5 5 . Off i ci al Re c or d s , Vo l .  ll ,  pa rt II , p .  6 2 3 . 
5 6 . Batt le s and Le ade r s ,  pp . 3 1 3- 3 17 . ( Editors ) 
C ONCLUSI ON 
. The auth o r  fe e l s  t hat t he S e ven Day ' s  Bat tl e s  v.re r e  c a u s e d  by 
two t hi ngs , f or the mo s t  part . The f i r s t  o f  the s e  w a s  t h e  p o or i nt e l ­
li g e n c e g i v e n  t h e  Uni on le ad e rs wi t h  whi ch t o  ope rat e • .  Mc Cl e l lan 
�a s l e d  t o  be li ev e t h at he wa s  o utnu.mber e d , and the pe opl e in wa sh-
. i ngton k ept re i nf ar  c e ment s  f ro.m him b e c a u s e  t he y  be l i eve d t hat Ja c ks on 
wa s s t r ong e r  t han w a s  t r ue ,  and fe lt him t o  b e  a g r e at thre at t o  t he 
' Uni on c ap it o l . Thi s c au s e d  a de l ay in t he o f fens e of t he Army o f  t he 
Pot omac t h at pr o ved to b e  f a t a l  t o  t h e  Peni n s u. l ar 0 8..L."llp ai gn . The se 
we re al l t he o ut g r owt h of th e poor int e l l ig e n c e  s uppli e d  t o  the 
Uni on b y  vari o u.s s o urc e s . 
The se c o nd o f  th e s e  1nai n c a us e s  was the da ri ng o f  Rob e rt E .  Le e .  
Le e t o ok a g r e at g amble i n  at t a c ki ng agai n st s u ch a st ron g  opp onent , 
and i t  p ai d  great di v idend s . Tho ugh t he gre at e r pl rt of t he a c ti ons 
d ur i ng the S even Day ' s we r e  vi c t or i e s for t he Uni o n  A;rm.y , t he f i na l  
o ut c ome was a g reat vic t or y  f o r  t he Confede ra t e s . 
Mc Cle l l an wa s , and has be e n ,  ·c r it i c i z e d f o r  hi s ac t i ons d u ri ng 
.t h i s  b l oo dy wee k i n  June , 1862 , b ut th e a uth or fe e l s  t hat a g r e at d e a l  
of t h i s  wa s unj us t . Mc C l el l an  w a s  not a gambl e r , hi s pe rs onal l i f e  
s h owe d thi s - -ye t h e  i s  he ld t o  b lame f o r  n ot b e i ng o ne . He w a s  a .mi li ­
t ary l e ade r th at gra s p e d all a s p e c t s  o f  war e xc e pt th e p o l it i c a l  end , 
·, 
an d hi s planni ng wa s s uch t h a t  i·t l eft noth ing t o  c h anc e . Thi s t yp e  
o f  a mi l i t ary l e ade r doe s no t gain s p e c t a c ul ar vi c t o ri e s , b ll t  th e  
v i c t or y  i s  t hei rs b e f ore the bat t le i s  fo ught . McCl el lan wo ul d  have 
t aken Ri c hn1ond had h e  re c e i ved th e a i d  h e  vvant e d  f r om. Wa shi ngt on . I f' 
t he s e  pe opl e want e d  a fight e r , Mc C l e l lan wa s  not th e i r .m.a n ;  i f' t he y  
want e d  a .ma s t er st rat e g i st , t hey had o n e  i n  Ge or ge B .  Mc C l e l l e.n .  I t  i s  
un:fb rt unat e t hat t he Uni on d i d  no t have a t r ue fig h t e r  in th e f orefI' o n il  
of t he i r gen er al s  at th e t ime o f  t he Se ve n Day ' s .  If they ha d ,  Mc Cle lla.d s 
planni ng and t ra i ni ng , car ri e d  o u t  by a t r ue :fi ght er , wo uld have b e e n 
a hard c o.mb i nat i on t o  beat . 
Vi'lii le he l ac ke d  th e drive fo r a d iff i c ult offense , 1v1c C l el lan was 
more than c l e ver in hi s wit hdrawal . The r e a l  h e ro of t he Uni on .P.xm.y 
wa s Fi t z -John Po rt er ,  who s e  V C orp s re c e iv e d  t he  brun t  o f  t he C onfe d erat3e 
at t a c ks , an d he ld up b e c aus e of P or t e r ' s  fi ne l ea d e rshi p .  
On the C o nf e der at e s id e  o f  t h e  pi c t ur e ,  Le e eme rg e d  a s  t he leader 
t hey n e e d e d  to c arry on t he war . I f  i t  had not been f or the p o or 
c o ordi nat i o n  of hi s att a c ks , c au s e d  b y  t he b l und e r s  of hi s s u b o rdi nat e 
of fi c e r s , h e  nli gbt have de s t ra ye d t he Army of th e Pot oin.a c , be s i d e s  
s av i ng Ri chmond . Jac k son fai l e d  him a ll d uri ng t he S eve n Day ' s ;  1'.'l'.agrude r , 
whi le g r e at at d e c ei vi ng t he e nemy , was he s i t ant a nd  i ne ff e c t i ve i n  
a c t ual batt l e . 
The Seven Day ' s wa s  a s t or y  of mi s j udgme nt an d mi sinf ormat i on on 
th e part of th e Uni on , a nd o n e  of bravery and b ung li ng on t he par"l"I 
o f  th e Sout h . 
The c o st of li f' e  o n  both s i de s  wa s  hi gh .  The bravery o f  b ot h  arLi e s  
wa s great . 1rhe o ut c ome o f  t he e nt il1e s t or y  wa s  t; he  ext e ns i o n  of c:i. 
b l o o dy wa r ,  t he r i s e  of a g r e at g e ne ra l  f'o r t h e So uth , and t he fall of 
a bri l l i an t , but we ak f i gh ti ng ,  g e ne ra l  :fo r t he North . lilc C l el lan 
r e c e i ve d  one mo re ch an c e , 1->..nt i e t e.m ,  and fa i l e d ; the n he le ft the s e r ­
v ic e . Lee s aw t h e  wa r o ut t o  i t s  bl o ody a n d  bit t er end , be c omi ng t he 
i do l  of eve ry yo ung land i n  t he s o uth , eve n t od ay .  
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